That her pride is not humbled, that she did not wish for peace prior to this advantage, is obvious, 1st. From her refusing to make a separate treaty with the Dutch, who, under the mediation of the Empress of Russia, seemed anxiously to wish it; 2dly. From her neglect to notice the last proposals of the mediating powers, which yet remain unanswered; so that if any alteration is made in their sentiments oh this subject, they must originate in their ill success in America, for in every other quarter their defensive war seems to have been supported with advantage. How far this will operate admits of a doubt, which prudence directs us not to rely upon. Money, the great support of modern wars, has been raised with more facility in England, than in any country in the world; and we find the minority last year censuring Lord North for giving the advantage of lending to his friends. Their losses may indeed render subscriptions more expensive to the public; but there is no well grounded room to suppose they will not fill up; and still less reason to believe, if the means for carrying on the war are attainable, that the vindictive spirit of the King and his ministry, and the overweening pride of the nation, will soon yield to make a peace, which involves their disgrace and humiliation. But as strength or weakness are mere comparative terms, we can form no judgment of the measures of Britain but by attending to the force and disposition of her enemies.

The United Provinces were evidently dragged into the war, and have prosecuted it as if they momentarily expected a peace. The Colonies in the West Indies have been taken, without being in a state to make the smallest resistance, and the active interposition of France alone saved those in the East from sharing the same fate. Our last letters from Holland place the distress of their commerce in a strong point of view. They are unhappily rent by parties, which clog the wheels of government; though it is said the party opposed to England are the most numerous and growing in strength, so that at some future day we may reasonably hope they will assume the entire ascendency; yet we can build very little on this, till the close of another year. This much is certain, they are not yet allied to us, nor have they given us reason to believe, that they intend to be so. They wish for peace, and will take no measures that can obstruct it. They have lent us no money, nor are they likely to do it; from whence we may presume, either that they doubt our success, or do not much interest themselves in it.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. XI — Part 142