It may possibly be expected, Sir, that I should close this long letter by a report on the matters it contains, but as it is a delicate subject to point out a mode for extending my own powers, I only beg leave to recommend the enclosed resolve.
Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, } January 31st, 1782. }
I was this day favored with yours of the 13th ultimo. I need not tell you, that the intelligence it conveyed, and the spirit in which it was written, afforded me the most sensible pleasure. The idea it holds forth of an attempt upon Charleston, and the prospect of success in it, is one that we dare not indulge here, more especially as troops have sailed from New York, and as we presume to Charleston, but you have taught us rather to measure your success by your genius than by your means.
I wish it were in my power to tell you, that our accounts from Europe were proportionate to our expectations. The combined fleets, as you know, have returned and separated, without having effected anything. The British are again masters of the ocean. Gibraltar is a rock, on which all the exertions of Spain seem to split, and the siege of fort St Philip seems to be carried on in the most energetic manner. We have no prospect of forming an alliance, either with Spain or Holland, who both appear to sigh for peace. Our loan on the guarantee of France with the last, is nearly completed. But what is not a little unsatisfactory, it is also nearly expended by advances, which France has made us on the credit of it. From Spain we are likely to get nothing.
The negotiations for a peace are entirely, at a stand; the mediating powers have no interest in wishing it, and the belligerent nations are neither of them sufficiently weakened to request their interposition. The Count de Vergennes assures us, that Britain will still make the most vigorous exertions. I mention these circumstances not only for your information, but that you may make the proper use of them in animating the exertions of the Southern States. It is the misfortune of America to presume too much upon each dawning of success, and to believe that peace must tread upon the heels of every little advantage, instead of being taught by her own struggles and difficulties, that every nation has resources, that surpass the expectations of its enemies.