The case is here in a simple aspect. There was no attempt made to explain or justify the delays in the shipments, and any attack on the statute on the ground that it includes delays resulting from the act of God, or cause over which the carriers have no control, is precluded by the construction put upon the act by the supreme court of the state.
The only proposition, then, which is presented, is whether the statute is beyond the power of government, and therefore offends the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States by depriving plaintiff in error of its property without due process of law.
This is contended upon two grounds: 1. That statute, as considered by the supreme court of the state, is a legislative determination of the quantum of damages arising from a breach of a private contract for the shipment of live stock, and a legislative determination of damages wholly distinct and apart from the exercise of police power, and not a punitive measure to enforce compliance with the commands of the statute. 2. The statute, being declared of such character, is 'a usurpation of functions which are exclusively judicial, contrary to the law of the land,' and repugnant to the provisions of the 14th Amendment.
It is the concession of the contentions that had the statute been considered by the supreme court a police regulation, the objection made to it would be without foundation. But, meeting the effect of the concesion, plaintiff in error asserts that if the court had so ruled, defendant in error would have had no right of action, because, under § 5, article 8, of the Constitution of the state, all penalties must be appropriated to the use and support of the common schools.
The court found no conflict between the law and the Constitution of the state. Section 5, article 8, however, was not discussed in any of the opinions. Other provisions of the Constitution were considered and the contentions based on them decided to be untenable. The omission is not important to our inquiry, and we shall assume, as plaintiff in error contends, that the court regarded the statute as giving compensation for damages for injuries suffered, rather than penalties for omission of duties prescribed. It does not follow, however, that the court decided that the statute was not passed in exercise of the power of the state to regulate the conduct of the carriers in the performance of their duties to the public. The opinion of the court makes the contrary manifest. The court said: 'In the instant case the enforcement of the law, as we view the record, will not deprive defendant of any constitutional guaranty, state or national. Defendant's property is affected by a public interest; having devoted that property to a use in which the public have an interest, it must, to the limit of the interest thus acquired by the public, submit to the control of such property for the public good. . . . The public is interested not only in being permitted to have its property transported for a reasonable compensation, but also in having that property, especially if subject to rapid depreciation, transported with reasonable promptness and care. . . . It is a matter of common knowledge that live stock confined in a freight car deteriorates in condition, and that if the animals are to be placed on market within a short time of the termination of the transportation, the depreciation is not confined to a shrinkage in weight, but to many other factors difficult to prove, but actually existing, and seriously affecting the market value of said property. As the damage accruing from the protracted confinement of stock is difficult to prove with reasonable exactitude, and yet always exists, the legislature has the power to provide for liquidated damages. Such legislation is not unsound in principle and has been upheld in many courts.' [84 Neb. 611, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1022, 122 N. W. 31.]
The court, in illustration of its views and the quality of the statute, compared it to § 4966 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 3415), which provides for a liability of $100 for the first infringing performance of a copyrighted dramatic piece, and $50 for the second performance, as, the court said, 'a reasonable liquidation of damages which the proprietor had suffered from the wrongful acts of the defendant.'
The court also adduced two examples from statutes of the state, sustained by decisions, in both of which $50 was given as liquidated damages; in one, against an officer for collecting a fee greater than allowed by law; in the other, against a mortgagee for failing to release a chattel mortgage; and $500 against an officer for rearresting a person after his discharge on habeas corpus.