[2] The members of this Convention were not required to have their domiciles in the places which they represented. Mr. Sumner sat as member for Marshfield, by which place he was chosen while absent from the State.
The question is on the final passage of the fifteen resolutions reported by the Committee on the Militia. And here let me adopt a suggestion dropped by my friend opposite [Mr. WILSON]. He regretted, if I understood him, that this whole subject was not compressed into one or two resolutions. Am I right?

MR. SUMNER. I agree with him. I regret that it was not compressed into one or two resolutions. I object to these resolutions for several reasons. In the first place, there are too many; in the second place, at least two of them seem to be an assumption of power belonging to Congress, and therefore at least of doubtful constitutionality; and, in the third place, because twelve of them undertake to control matters which it were better to leave with the Legislature.

On the formation of the Constitution of Massachusetts, in 1780, it was natural that our fathers should introduce details with regard to the militia and its organization. The Constitution of the United States had not then been made. But since the establishment of this Constitution the whole condition of the militia is changed. Among the powers expressly given to Congress is the power "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, _reserving_ to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." And Congress has proceeded to exercise this power by the organization of a national militia. Whatever might have been the original inducement to multiform provisions on this subject in the Constitution of Massachusetts, none such exists at this day, and it is impolitic at least to introduce them.

I fear that they are more than impolitic. I will not argue here the question of Constitutional Law; but I appeal to the better judgment of my professional brethren--and I am happy to see some of them lingering at this late hour--that any attempt on the part of the State to interfere, in any way, by addition or subtraction, with the organization of the national militia, is an experiment which we should not introduce into the permanent text of our organic law. If the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the powers of Congress are to prevail, then, it seems to me, any such assumption, in a case where the original power of Congress is clear, will be unconstitutional and void. In the famous case of _Prigg_ v. _Pennsylvania_, after an elaborate discussion at the bar, all State legislation on the subject of fugitive slaves was declared unconstitutional and void, while Congress is recognized as the sole depository of power on this subject. According to my recollection, it was expressly held that legislation by Congress excluded all State legislation on the same subject, whether to control, qualify, or _superadd_ to the remedy enacted by Congress. I commend gentlemen, now so swift with these provisions, to the study of this precedent. It is comparatively recent; and the principle of interpretation which it establishes is applicable to State laws on the militia, even though entirely inapplicable to State laws on fugitive slaves,--for the simple reason, that in the former case the original power of Congress is clear, while in the latter it is denied.





