The facts upon which the controversy in this suit depends are as follows:
The ground on which the court below proceeded seems to have been that the mortgages given by the co-sureties, each to the other, were in equity securities for the payment of the principal debt, which inured to the benefit of the creditors upon the principle of subrogation. The application of the principle of subrogation in favor of creditors and of sureties has undoubtedly been frequent in the courts of equity in England and the United States, and is an ancient and familiar head of their jurisdiction.
It was distinctly stated, as to creditors, in the early case of Maure v. Harrison, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 93, where the whole report is as follows: 'A bond creditor shall in this court, have the benefit of all counter-bonds or collateral security given by the principal to the surety; as if A. owes B. money, and he and C. are bound for it, A. gives C. a mortgage or bond to indemnify him, B. shall have the benefit of it to recover his debt.' And the converse of the rule was stated by Sir WILLIAM GRANT in Wright v. Morley, 11 Ves. 12, where he said: 'I conceive that as a creditor is entitled to the benefit of all the securities the principal debtor has given to his surety, the surety has full as good an equity to the benefit of all the securities the principal gives to the creditor.' And it applies equally between sureties, so that securities placed by the principal in the hands of one to operate as an indemnity by payment of the debt, shall inure to the benefit of all.
Many sufficient Maxims of the law conspire to justify the rule. To avoid circuity and multiplicity of actions; to prevent the exercise of one's right from interfering with the rights of others; to treat that as done which ought to be done; to require that the burden shall be borne by him for whose advantage it has been assumed; and to secure equaity among those equally obliged and benefited, are perhaps not all the familiar adages which may legitimately be assigned in support of it. It is, in fact, a natural and necessary equity which flows from the relation of the parties, and though not the result of contract, is nevertheless the execution of their intentions. For, when a debtor, who has given personal guaranties for the performance of his obligation, has further secured it by a pledge in the hands of his creditor, or an indemnity in those of his surety, it is conformable to the presumed intent of all the parties to the arrangement, that the fund so appropriated shall be administered as a trust for all the purposes, which a payment of the debt will accomplish; and a court of equity accordingly will give to it this effect. All this, it is to be observed, as the rule verbally requires, presupposes that the fund specially pledged and sought to be primarily applied is the property of the debtor, primarily liable for the payment of the debt; and it is because it is so that equity impresses upon it the trust, which requires that it shall be appropriated to the satisfaction of the creditor, the exoneration of the surety, and the discharge of the debtor. The implication is that a pledge made expressly to one is in trust for another, because the relation between the parties is such that that construction of the transaction best effectuates the express purpose for which it was made. It follows that the present case cannot be brought within either the terms or the reason of the rule; for, as the property, in respect to which the creditors assert a lien, was not the property of the principal debtor, and has never been expressly pledged to the payment of the debt, so no equitable construction can convert it by implication into a security for the creditor.