Prudential capital controls are typical ways of prudential regulation that takes the form of capital controls and regulates a country’s capital account inflows. Prudential capital controls aim to mitigate systemic risk, reduce business cycle volatility, increase macroeconomic stability, and enhance social welfare.
Distinctions from the Capital Controls in General
The term “prudential” distinguishes such typical capital control measures from other general capital controls by emphasizing both the motive of “prudence” and the ex-ante timing. Firstly, the prudence motivation requirement says that such regulation should curb and manage the excessive risk accumulation process with cautious forethoughts for the purpose of preventing an emerging financial crisis and economic collapse. Secondly, the ex-ante timing means that such regulation should be taken effectively before the realization of any unfettered crisis as opposed to taking policy interventions after a severe crisis already hits the economy. In addition, prudential capital controls only apply to capital inflows because the excessive risk accumulation process that intrinsically creates the domestic financial vulnerability is usually associated with capital inflow rather than outflow. Neely (1999) summarized some other nonprudential ways of exercising capital controls. For example, restrictions on the volume and price for domestic currency and financial asset transactions, requirements for administrative approval of capital outflow, or limits on the amount of money that a citizen is allowed to take out of the country.

History
The history of capital free flows and controls unfolds with the history of financial globalization. At the onset, capital moved freely across borders during the Gold Standard period before World War I. After World War II, owing to the suspicion that a country’s macroeconomic instability could be due to the volatile capital flows, capital flows were deliberately managed under a variety of administrative controls as part of the governance in the international monetary Bretton Woods system.

Starting from early 1970s, increasingly relaxed capital controls along with the adoptions of floating exchange rate regime worldwide, though in the midst of concerns, announced the collapse of the Bretton Woods. Roughly from 1990s to 2009 known as the Washington Consensus period, it was widely accepted that the economic prosperity in the emerging market economies was attributed to the liberalization of their capital accounts and the increasing capital inflow. Then the policy prescriptions for these countries were that capital controls should be loosened and eventually abandoned.

The pro-capital flow arguments were not reviewed and critiqued until the Great Recession in the late 2000s. Emerging markets experienced strong capital inflows in the boom stage of a business cycle whereas they witnessed huge flow reverse and financial collapse in the bust period. This boom and bust cycles in international capital flows imposed significant welfare costs. Then the theoretical underpinnings of the Great Recession crisis mechanism give a role for the prudential capital controls as an intervention to adjust the market imperfections in order to mitigate the systemic boom-bust cycle effects brought by the international capital flows
Theoretical Paradigms for Prudential Regulations
To justify the necessity of the external regulation, market imperfections of a free market economy must be identified as socially inefficient and adjustable in the sense of pareto improving. Three different theoretical paradigms can be used to illustrate the market imperfections and to introduce the role of prudential regulations: 1. The Agency Paradigm; 2. The Mood Swing Paradigm. 3. The Externality Paradigm. The Prudential Capital Controls, as a particular form of prudential regulations, builds its theory foundation heavily on the paradigm of externalities.
The Agency paradigm highlights various forms of principal-agent problems. An example is a moral hazard problem: considered as lender of last resort and provider of deposit insurance, government induces the under-regulated banks to take excessive risks which creates the financial vulnerability. The moral hazard problem occurs in both the individual level and in a collective fashion, which justifies the prudential regulations.





