In philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology, intersubjectivity is the relation or intersection between people's cognitive perspectives.

Definition

is a term coined by social scientists to refer to a variety of types of human interaction. For example, social psychologists Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish listed at least seven definitions of intersubjectivity (and other disciplines have additional definitions): people's agreement on the shared definition of a concept; people's mutual awareness of agreement or disagreement, or of understanding or misunderstanding each other; people's attribution of intentionality, feelings, and beliefs to each other; people's implicit or automatic behavioral orientations towards other people; people's interactive performance within a situation; people's shared and taken-for-granted background assumptions, whether consensual or contested; and "the variety of possible relations between people's perspectives".

Intersubjectivity

has been used in social science to refer to agreement. There is intersubjectivity between people if they agree on a given set of meanings or share the same perception of a situation. Similarly, Thomas Scheff defines as "the sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals".

Intersubjectivity

also has been used to refer to the common-sense, shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions with each other and used as an everyday resource to interpret the meaning of elements of social and cultural life. If people share common sense, then they share a definition of the situation.

Intersubjectivity

The term has also been used to refer to shared (or partially shared) of meaning. Self-presentation, lying, practical jokes, and social emotions, for example, all entail not a shared definition of the situation but partially shared divergences of meaning. Someone who is telling a lie is engaged in an intersubjective act because they are working with two different definitions of the situation. Lying is thus genuinely intersubjective (in the sense of operating between two subjective definitions of reality).

Among the early authors who explored this conception in psychoanalysis, in an explicit or implicit way, were Jacques Lacan, Heinz Kohut, Robert Stolorow, George E. Atwood, Jessica Benjamin in the United States, and Silvia Montefoschi in Italy.

Psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin, in The Bonds of Love, wrote, "The concept of intersubjectivity has its origins in the social theory of Jürgen Habermas (1970), who used the expression 'the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding' to designate an individual capacity and a social domain." Psychoanalyst Molly Macdonald argued in 2011 that a "potential point of origin" for the term was in Jean Hyppolite's use of l'inter-subjectivité in an essay from 1955 on "The Human Situation in the Hegelian Phenomenology". However, the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, whose work Habermas and Hyppolite draw upon, was the first to develop the term, which was subsequently elaborated upon by other phenomenologists such as Edith Stein, Emmanuel Levinas, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Philosophy

Contemporarily, intersubjectivity is the major topic in both the analytic and the continental traditions of philosophy. Intersubjectivity is considered crucial not only at the relational level but also at the epistemological and even metaphysical levels. For example, intersubjectivity is postulated as playing a role in establishing the truth of propositions, and constituting the so-called objectivity of objects.

A central concern in consciousness studies of the past 50 years is the so-called problem of other minds, which asks how we can justify our belief that people have minds much like our own and predict others' mind-states and behavior, as our experience shows we often can. Contemporary philosophical theories of intersubjectivity need to address the problem of other minds.