“It will be öniggräseen that except in its being more scientifically put together, this German attack is, practically, precisely similar to that employed by the Americans, with the sole difference that the breech-loader has conferred on the assailants the advantage of being able to make a more extended use of their weapons, and has reduced to a certain extent the disadvantage of having to halt.
“Had we, in 1871, been thoroughly well informed as to the methods employed across the Atlantic, we should have seen at once that the new weapons did not necessarily entail any alteration in principle in our drill book, and with a little alteration in detail, have attained at one bound to a point of efficiency not reached even in Germany till several years after the war.”--“_Tactics and Organization_,” by Capt. F. N. Maude, R. E., p. 299, _et seq._
[21] In Clery’s “Minor Tactics” occurs the following astonishing passage: “The use made of entrenchments by the Turks was not the least remarkable feature of the war of 1877. Field works, as aids in defense, had been used with advantage in previous wars, but no similar instance exists of an impregnable system of earthworks being improvised under the very noses of the enemy.” Col. Clery’s book is an evidence of his intelligent study and thorough knowledge of European military history; yet, as late as 1885, this professor of tactics at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst seems not to have heard of Johnston’s works at Kenesaw Mountain, or the fortifications constructed at Spottsylvania and Petersburg.
[23] For a description of the American military telegraph, see Grant’s Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 205, _et seq._ See also the comments on the military telegraph, in Sherman’s Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 398.
THE PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KÖNIGGRÄTZ TO THE DANUBE.
The day after the battle of Königgrätz was occupied by the Prussians in resting their fatigued troops, and in separating the mingled corps and detachments of the different armies. Late in the afternoon the first movements in advance began.
The fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz were still in the hands of the Austrians. They were well garrisoned, and could only be taken by siege. Both were summoned to surrender, and both refused. These fortresses were of the greatest importance, as they commanded the line of railway on which the Prussians depended for supplies, and controlled the passage of the Elbe in the vicinity of the battle field. Strong detachments were, therefore, left to mask the fortresses, and on the 5th of July the Prussian armies marched to Pardubitz and Przelautsch, at which points they crossed the Elbe. A division of Landwehr was sent to Prague, which city surrendered, without resistance, on the 8th of July. The Prussians were thus able to open communications with the rear by rail, _via_ Pardubitz, Prague, Turnau and Reichenberg, in spite of the fortresses of Theresienstadt, Königgrätz and Josephstadt.