In the view we take of the case it will not be necessary to consider the first defense mentioned, nor the second, so far as to determine whether the right to use the words mentioned as a trade-mark was forfeited absolutely by the assignor's misrepresentations as to the manufacture of the article. It is sufficient for the disposition of the case that the misrepresentation has been continued by the complainant. A court of equity will extend no aid to sustain a claim to a trade-mark of an article which is put forth with a misrepresentation to the public as to the manufacturer of the article, and as to the place where it is manufactured, both of which particulars were originally circumstances to guide the purchaser of the medicine.
It is admitted that whatever value the medicine possesses was given to it by its original manufacturer, Moses Atwood. He lived in Georgetown, Massachusetts. He manufactured the medicine there. He sold it with the designation that it was his preparation, 'Atwood's Vegetable Physical Jaundice Bitters,' and was manufactured there by him. As the medicine was tried and proved to be useful, it was sought for under that designation, and that purchasers might not be misled, it was always accompanied with a label, showing by whom and at what place it was prepared. These statements were deemed important in promoting the use of the article and its sale, or they would not have been continued by the assignees of the original inventor. And yet they could not be used with any honest purpose when both statements had ceased to be true. It is not honest to state that a medicine is manufactured by Moses Atwood, of Georgetown, Massachusetts, when it is manufactured by the Manhattan Medicine Company in the city of New York.
Any one has as unquestionable right to affix to articles manufactured by him a mark or device not previously appropriated, to distinguish them from articles of the same general character manufactured or sold by others. He may thus notify the public of the origin of the article, and secure to himself the benefits of any particular excellence it may possess from the manner or materials of its manufacture. His trade-mark is both a sign of the quality of the article and an assurance to the public that it is the genuine product of his manufacture. It thus often becomes of great value to him, and in its exclusive use the court will protect him against attempts of others to pass off their products upon the public as his. This protection is afforded not only as a matter of justice to him, but to prevent imposition upon the public. Manuf'g Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 54.
The object of the trade-mark being to indicate, by its meaning or association, the origin or ownership of the article, it would seem that when a right to its use is transferred to others, either by act of the original manufacturer or by operation of law, the fact of transfer should be stated in connection with its use; otherwise a deception would be practiced upon the public and the very fraud accomplished, to prevent which courts of equity interfere to protect the exclusive right of the original manufacturer. If one affix to goods of his own manufacture signs or marks which indicate that they are the manufacture of others, he is deceiving the public and attempting to pass upon them goods as possessing a quality and merit which another's skill has given to similar articles, and which his own manufacture does not possess in the estimation of purchasers. To put forth a statement, therefore, in the form of a circular or label attached to an article, that it is manufactured in a particular place, by a person whose manufacture there had acquired a great reputation, when, in fact, it is manufactured by a different person at a different place, is a fraud upon the public which no court of equity will countenance.
This doctrine is illustrated and asserted in the case of Leather Cloth Co. (limited) v. American Leather Cloth Co. (limited,) which was elaborately considered by Lord Chancellor WESTBURY, and afterwards in the house of lords on appeal from his decree. 4 De G., J. & S. 137, and 11 Clark, H. L. Cas. 523.