K. was an individualist. He was a Master of Expedients; the greatest probably the world has ever seen. Whenever he saw _any_ organization his inclination was to smash it, and often--but not always--he was right. This may sound odd in Anglo-Celtic ears. But most British organizations are relics of the past. They are better smashed than patched, and K. loved smashing.--IAN H., 1920.]

[Footnote 15: Lord K.'s reason for putting in this last paragraph may be obscure unless I make it clear. As explained in a previous footnote, Lord K. knew that I knew his strong personal view that the smashing blow to our military reputation which would be caused by an evacuation of the Dardanelles must, in course of time, imperil our hold upon Egypt. Therefore, for the moment, it was necessary to warn me that the problem must be considered in the purely military, tactical, aspect.--IAN H. 1920.]

Gallipoli Diary, Volume 2 — Part 152

[Footnote 16: Lest anyone should imagine there is any privilege or secrecy attached to this document it may be well to explain that all the best passages came back to me from Melbourne in due course; often with marginal comment.--IAN H., 1920.]

Gallipoli Diary, Volume 2 — Part 152

STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR HUGH SIMPSON BAIKIE, EX-COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH ARTILLERY AT CAPE HELLES.

Gallipoli Diary, Volume 2 — Part 152

The first landing of British troops at Cape Helles took place on 25th April, 1915. On arriving at that place during the first week in May, I found that heavy fighting had occurred without ceasing from the time of the disembarkation. Having come straight from the Headquarters Staff of the 2nd Army in France, where the question of artillery ammunition was a constant source of anxiety to all the higher commanders, I at once set to work to discover what reserves remained in the hands of G.H.Q. and what the daily expenditure had been since the landing. The greatest difficulty was experienced in obtaining figures of expenditure from the units, so constant had been the fighting, which still continued, and so great the casualties, and consequent confusion in reckoning expenditure. Yet, after some delay, sufficient information was obtained to enable me to demonstrate with certainty that, if such severe fighting continued, the Force would soon be in danger of losing their artillery support.