A few days later, I sailed for America to make my report to President Wilson. It was my intention, upon my arrival in New York, to make this report in the form of a letter, and with this idea in mind, while still aboard ship, I wrote several drafts of it by hand, and in New York dictated a letter in final form to the President under date of September 15, 1917. I finally decided, however, that a verbal report was better, and consequently, I proceeded to Washington, and on September 19th, called on the President. I gave him at considerable length the information I had gathered. As our conversation, however, was simply a verbal enlargement of my letter of the 15th, I will quote that letter here. It is, I think, of some historical importance:
After close observations, visiting fronts, conversations with members of the French Cabinet, Generals and others, both French and British, I have arrived at the following conclusions, which I submit for your consideration, and expect to elaborate upon, when you grant me an interview. Among the men I have talked with are Generals Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Arthur Currie, Joffre, Pershing, Sibert, Biddle, and others, and also Messieurs Painlevé, Ribot, Cambon, and Steeg of the Cabinet.
No separate peace can be made at present with the Turks as they still think that the Germans will be victorious, and because many of the members of the Union and Progress Committee are enriching themselves through the continuation of this war.
The Turkish atrocities perpetrated against Armenians, Syrians, and Arabs establish beyond doubt that the Turks should no longer be permitted to govern non-Moslems and non-Turks of any description.
The British and French successes at Verdun, Ypres, and Lens have reduced the German unused Reserve Divisions from forty-four in April to five in August, and have demonstrated that the German positions are not, as has long been believed in the United States, impregnable. The British and French are now confident of final victory, depending, however, on the coöperation of the United States Army.
For moral and political effect, they deem it highly desirable that more American troops, though unprepared, be sent immediately.
The German autocracy with its strong leadership and blind following of its allies will never yield until German military prestige has been destroyed.