‘Be pleased, therefore, to humiliate our opponent, and shew thyself an upright and fearless judge in the cause of truth, that it may be said of thee as it is written in the 8th chapter of the 3d book of kings,—‘Judicabit servos suos, justificans quod justum est, attribuens eis secundum justitiam.’ He will judge his servants, justifying them that are upright, and giving to each according to his deserts. From this, as well as from the preceding arguments, it plainly appears, that thou art bounden to do the justice required by my lady of Orleans.

‘I shall now demonstrate the crime of our adversary, and how he perpetrated such an unpardonable deed, to which I shall add six arguments to prove the fealty and loyalty of my lord of Orleans, taking for my theme the words of the advocate of our opponent,—namely, ‘Radix omnium malorum cupiditas.’

The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet Vol. 1 of 13 — Part 173

‘It seems to me, that covetousness has been the original cause of this murder,—not covetousness of wealth alone, but likewise covetousness of honours and ambition.—Covetousness has then been the original cause, as shall more plainly be shown hereafter.

The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet Vol. 1 of 13 — Part 173

‘To prove the greatness and abomination of this crime, I shall use six arguments. The first is founded on our adversary having not the power or authority of a judge over the deceased.

The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet Vol. 1 of 13 — Part 173

‘Secondly, Supposing he may have had any authority over him, he proceeded in his own way, contrary to every maxim of law and of justice.

‘My third argument is grounded on the strict alliance that had been formed between my late lord of Orleans and our adversary.

‘Fourthly, That this is a damnable murder, and cannot any way be defended or explained.

‘Fifthly, That our opponent caused my lord of Orleans to be slain with a wicked intention.

‘Sixthly, That, not satisfied with having caused the duke of Orleans to be deprived of his life, he has exerted himself to disgrace his fame, by defamatory libels,—thus, as it were, slaying him a second time.

‘As to my first argument, it plainly appears, that the malice of our adversary is incorrigible, seeing that he had not any authority over the deceased; for, according to the laws and decrees, as well as to reason and the holy Scriptures, no one can put another to death without authority from the judge or judicial. Otherwise, any one may slay another at his pleasure, and tumults and confusion would reign without any chief or head, and every one would alternately, when strongest, make himself king.