But up to this point our calculations have assumed that under a Government postal express the railroads would continue to obtain their 50% of the charges on each package transported by express. This method of calculating the return due to the railroad is certainly ingenious in its simplicity and lack of scientific basis, but it is just as certainly unfair to the shipper of parcels by express. Let us consider, for example, two shipments of similar articles under similar conditions--one from New York City to Yonkers, New York, a distance of some 20 miles; the other from New York City to San Francisco, a distance of more than 3,000 miles. In each case, the express companies collect the parcel and deliver it to the railroad in New York City; and collect the parcel from the railroad and deliver it to the consignee, in the first case in Yonkers; and in the second case in San Francisco. In both cases, the services rendered by the express companies are about identical, aside from the different lengths of time during which space and protection in express cars must be afforded. But the services rendered by the railroad companies are far different in the two cases. In the first case, the parcel is carried for less than an hour; in the second place, for some days. Obviously, the share of the railroad in the entire service rendered in transporting the parcels is less in the first case than in the second, but in each case it gets the same share of the total express charge--namely, 50%.
Such a system in its very nature must thwart any attempt to make express rates reflect the value of express service. For, of course, the rates actually fixed endeavor to do justice to both the express companies and the railroads in each case considered above. In the first case, the rate must be high enough so that 50% of it will not be too glaringly little for the express companies to retain for their _relatively_ more important and more costly service of collecting a parcel in New York and delivering it in Yonkers. In the second case, the rate must be high enough so that 50% of it will not be too glaringly little to turn over to the railroad for their _relatively_ more important and more costly service of carrying the parcel across the continent. The railroad directors and express company directors cannot be expected to have reached a fair compromise after fighting for their own interests when the contracts were originally made, for, as has been seen, their interests are largely identical. It would seem, then, that only the shipper sending a parcel several hundred miles is charged a fee commensurate with the value of the service rendered him. It would seem that shippers sending parcels shorter distances must be charged too much and that shippers sending parcels longer distances must be charged too little. A glance at parcel post rates proves the validity of this surmise, for parcel post rates are lower than express rates for shorter distances and higher for longer distances. Under the present system of competition between the parcel post and the express companies, the nature of the contracts between the express companies and the railroads compels express rates which unfairly discriminate against the express companies at the shorter distances and unfairly discriminate against the parcel-post at the longer distances.