[Argument of Counsel from pages 49-51 intentionally omitted] Mr. Thomas D. Thacher, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United States.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 52-56 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. William A. Schnader, Atty. Gen., of Pennsylvania, and William A. Stevens, Atty. Gen., of New Jersey, amici curiae.
Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The University of Illinois imported scientific apparatus for use in one of its educational departments. Customs duties were exacted at the rates prescribed by the Tariff Act of 1922, c. 356, 42 Stat. 858. The university paid under protest, insisting that as an instrumentality of the state of Illinois, and discharging a governmental function, it was entitled to import the articles duty free. At the hearing on the protest, the Customs Court decided in favor of the Government (59 Treas. Dec. 747) and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed the decision. 61 Treas.Dec. 1334. This Court granted certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 308 (28 USCA 308); 287 U.S. 596, 53 S.Ct. 315, 77 L.Ed. --.
The Tariff Act of 1922 is entitled, 'An Act to provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States, and for other purposes.' The Congress thus asserted that it was exercising its constitutional authority 'to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.' Article 1, § 8, cl. 3. The words of the Constitution 'comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other, to which this power does not extend.' Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 193, 6 L.Ed. 23. It is an essential attribute of the power that it is exclusive and plenary. As an exclusive power, its exercise may not be limited, qualified, or impeded to any extent by state action. Id., pages 196-200 of 9 Wheat., 6 L.Ed. 23; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446, 6 L.Ed. 678; Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 173, 16 L.Ed. 644; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492, 493, 24 S.Ct. 349, 48 L.Ed. 525. The power is buttressed by the express provision of the Constitution denying to the States authority to lay imposts or duties on imports or exports without the consent of the Congress. Article 1, § 10, cl. 2.
The Congress may determine what articles may be imported into this country and the terms upon which importation is permitted. No one can be said to have a vested right to carry on foreign commerce with the United States. Buttfield v. Stranahan, supra; The Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166, 176, 177, 32 S.Ct. 310, 56 L.Ed. 390; Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216, 218, 219, 35 S.Ct. 285, 59 L.Ed. 544; Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325, 329, 330, 36 S.Ct. 131, 60 L.Ed. 308, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 317. If the Congress saw fit to lay an embargo or to prohibit altogether the importation of specified articles, as the Congress may (The Brigantine William, 2 Hall, Amer. L.J., 255, Fed. Cas. No. 16,700; Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, pages 192, 193 of 9 Wheat., 6 L.Ed. 23; Brolan v. United States, supra; Weber v. Freed, supra; Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204), no state by virtue of any interest of its own would be entitled to override the restriction. The principle of duality in our system of government does not touch the authority of the Congress in the regulation of foreign commerce.
Appellant argues that the Tariff Act is a revenue measure; that it is not the less so because it if framed with a view, as its title states, of encouraging the industries of the United States (Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411, 412, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624); that the duty is a tax, that the act is not one for the regulation of commerce but is an exertion of the taxing power; and that, as such, it is subject to the constitutional limitation that the Congress may not lay a tax so as to impose a direct burden upon an instrumentality of a state used in the performance of a governmental function.