[85] Flourens, "De la vie et de l'Intelligence," 2nd edition, Paris, Garnier Frères, 1852, p. 49.
The following famous verse of the ancient philosopher Epicharmus, proves that the ancients in general recognized the intellectual nature of perception: Νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά. (_Mens videt, mens audit; cætera surda et cœca._)[86] Plutarch in quoting this verse, adds:[87] ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος (_quia affectio oculorum et aurium nullum affert sensum, intelligentia absente_). Shortly before too he says: Στράτωνος τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τοπαράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει. (_Stratonis physici exstat ratiocinatio, qua "sine intelligentia sentiri omnino nihil posse" demonstrat._)[88] Again shortly after he says: ὅθεν ἀνάγκη, πᾶσιν, οἷς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ τῷ νοεῖν αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφύκαμεν (_quare necesse est, omnia, quæ sentiunt, etiam intelligere, siquidem intelligendo demum sentiamus_).[89] A second verse of Epicharmus might be connected with this, which is quoted by Diogenes Laertes (iii. 16):
Εὔμαιε, τὸ σοφόν ἐστιν οὐ καθ' ἓν μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅσα περ ζῇ, πάντα καὶ γνώμαν ἔχει.
[86] "It is the mind that sees and hears; all besides is deaf and blind." (Tr. Ad.)
[87] Plutarch, "De solert. animal." c. 3. "For the affection of our eyes and ears does not produce any perception, unless it be accompanied by thought." (Tr. Ad.)
[88] "Straton, the physicist, has proved that 'without thinking it is quite impossible to perceive.'" (Tr. Ad.)
[89] "Therefore it is necessary that all who perceive should also think, since we are so constituted as to perceive by means of thinking." (Tr. Ad.)
(_Eumaee, sapientia non uni tantum competit, sed quæcunque vivunt etiam intellectum habent._) Porphyry likewise endeavours to show at length that all animals have understanding.[90]
Now, that it should be so, follows necessarily from the intellectual character of perception. All animals, even down to the very lowest, must have Understanding--that is, knowledge of the causal law, although they have it in very different degrees of delicacy and of clearness; at any rate they must have as much of it as is required for perception by their senses; for sensation without Understanding would be not only a useless, but a cruel gift of Nature. No one, who has himself any intelligence, can doubt the existence of it in the higher animals. But at times it even becomes undeniably evident that their knowledge of causality is actually _à priori_, and that it does not arise from the habit of seeing one thing follow upon another. A very young puppy will not, for instance, jump off a table, because he foresees what would be the consequence. Not long ago I had some large curtains put up at my bed-room window, which reached down to the floor, and were drawn aside from the centre by means of a string. The first morning they were opened I was surprised to see my dog, a very intelligent poodle, standing quite perplexed, and looking upwards and sidewards for the cause of the phenomenon: that is, he was seeking for the change which he knew _à priori_ must have taken place. Next day the same thing happened again.--But even the lowest animals have perception--consequently Understanding--down to the aquatic polypus, which has no distinct organs of sensation, yet wanders from leaf to leaf on its waterplant, while clinging to it with its feelers, in search of more light.