The process involved some talking: "I have had my interview with Briand and Gallieni," wrote Lord Kitchener to the Prime Minister. "As regards Salonica it is very difficult to get in a word; they were both full of the necessity of pushing in troops, and would not think of coming out. They simply sweep all military difficulties and dangers aside, and go on political lines--such as saving a remnant of Serbs, bringing Greece in, and inducing Rumania to join." [2]
Other conferences followed, at all of which the French spoke so loudly that the noble British nation could not possibly help hearing--_la noble nation britannique n'est pas restée sourde_. The truth is, France was set on what { 77} M. Delcassé now called the _mirage balkanique_, partly from considerations of a domestic nature, chiefly for reasons connected with the future balance of power in the Near East--and England could not leave her there alone. So the "_nous resterons_" policy prevailed; and the continued presence of Franco-British forces on Greek soil led, as it was bound to do, to abnormal relations with the Greek Government.
The wish of the Allies was to obtain from Greece full licence for the safe accommodation and the operations of their troops; while it was the earnest endeavour of Greece not to let her complaisance towards one group of belligerents compromise her in the eyes of the other. The little kingdom found itself between two clashing forces: the one triumphant on land, the other dominating the sea. But of the two the German peril was the more imminent. The Kaiser's legions were at Monastir--any act that might be construed as a breach of neutrality would bring them in a month to Athens.
M. Skouloudis--a stately octogenarian who, after refusing three times the Premiership, had assumed power in this crisis at the King's insistent desire because, as he said, he considered it his duty so to do--took up the only attitude that could have been expected in the circumstances: the attitude that was dictated by the instinct of self-preservation.
Unlike M. Venizelos, whose mind revolved constantly about war at all hazards: unlike other statesmen who regarded war as an eventuality to be accepted or declined according as conditions might be favourable or unfavourable, M. Skouloudis seemed resolutely to eliminate war from his thoughts.