Screenshoot from New China TV Youtube channel video. In Sino-Greek relations, the dominant narrative in Greek mainstream media runs that China is taking the lead by investing in Greece, mostly through its flagship project in Piraeus. But a more layered account of the events, whereby Greek shipowners catalyzed that deal and gained concessions in China in return, is often overlooked. The controversial practices of Greek shipping tycoons in past decades may suggest why. The most common perception of China-Greece relations in public opinion over the past few years is that China’s investment in Greek port infrastructure provided benefits to both countries, at a time when Greece badly needed support. China’s state-owned shipping giant COSCO became involved in Piraeus, Greece’s largest port, to the southwest of Athens, beginning in 2008 with the acquisition of a container terminal, and culminating in 2016 with an acquisition of 51 percent of the company running the port, and likely to soon increase to 67. This gave Chinese business a critical entry point for their Maritime Silk Road in Europe. This video by New China TV neatly sums up the official Chinese and Greek “win-win” narrative, whereby COSCO gets to increase container throughput into Europe, and Greece turns into a “logistics hub”: Populist fantasies credit the strength of the relationship to heritage: “Greece and China represent two of the most ancient civilizations in the history of humanity”, says the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs; A less romantic analysis, meanwhile, underlines the role of Chinese business during the crisis years: “China invested in Greece, when others shined through their absence”, said Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis at the Greek-Chinese Business Forum in Shanghai in 2016. The Chinese ambassador to Greece, Zhang Qiyue, commemorated in November 2020 in an op-ed an event from the Cold War era: In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China Greek shipowners were the first to break the blockade and deliver much-needed supplies and equipment to China. Her narrative conveniently overlooks the distinction between the Greek government (firmly allied to the US at the time) and its rogue businessmen. But it is a reminder that Greek presence in China is not new. Following COSCO’s takeover of Piraeus, leftist prime minister Alexis Tsipras (2015-2019) said in a speech at a high-level One Belt One Road Forum, in Beijing: An increasing number of Greek shipowners build their ships in China, while our biggest port – is becoming a global gateway to Europe for products coming from Chinese and other Asian ports Tsipras’ conservative successor Kyriakos Mitsotakis, echoed this during his meeting with Xi Jinping in Shanghai in 2019: In ships’ supply chain, it is important to look at Greek businesses which have a great know-how in ship supply and may cooperate with Chinese shipyards, so that this market can open up also in this respect. This will be a win-win solution for Greek producers, for Chinese shipyards and, naturally, for Greek ship-owners, who will continue to build their ships in China. A lesser known narrative–though by no means concealed–suggests that COSCO ended up in Piraeus through a synergy of Chinese interests and Greek shipping, years before Greece’s national debt crisis. When we spoke with Konstantinos Tsimonis, Lecturer in Chinese Society at King's College London, he suggested that Greek shipowners, who control a fifth of global fleet capacity, and over half for the European Union, may be acting as a political mediator or facilitator for Chinese business in Greece: Δεν μπορείς απλά να πας και να επενδύσεις έτσι: Έχει σημασία ποιός σε φέρει και πόσο embedded είσαι: τοπικοί παράγοντες βοήθησαν τους κινέζους να διαπλεύσουν τα αχαρτογράφητα–για τους ίδιους–νερά της ελληνικής οικονομίας και πολιτικής. Η COSCO μπορεί να φέρει ένα θέμα στο Ελληνικό Κοινοβούλιο σε 24 ώρες, αν νιώθει ότι κινδυνεύουν οι επενδύσεις της. Δεν μπορείς να το κάνεις αυτό χωρίς ισχυρούς τοπικούς εταίρους. You don’t just go and invest like that: it matters who brings you and how embedded you are: local agents helped the Chinese navigate through the uncharted–for them–waters of Greek economy and politics. COSCO can bring an issue to the Greek parliament in 24 hours, if it feels its investments are at risk. You can’t do that without strong local partners. But he also questioned the overall relevance of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Η εταιρική σχέση υπήρχε, και θα υπήρχε ανεξαρτήτως από το BRI ή όχι. Το BRI έρχεται να δώσει μία συνολική πλατφόρμα, ένα όραμα σε όλες αυτές τις επιχειρηματικές δραστηριότητες των κινεζικών εταιριών, κρατικών και μη. Επίσης, τους προσφέρει κάποια χρηματοδοτικά εργαλεία.