The main grounds of this criticism were the contentions:
(1) That the Monroe Doctrine was not a part of international law and therefore its observance as such could not be urged upon other nations.
(2) That it was not even an established principle of American diplomacy, since the original declaration was merely a protest against apprehended aggression on the part of a combination of European powers which had long since ceased to threaten this continent.
(3) That even granting that the Monroe Doctrine was a declaration of American policy, it was merely a policy and imposed no obligation on the government to enforce it except where our interests were directly concerned.
(4) That the occupation of a few thousand acres of uninhabited territory by Great Britain, even if it did rightfully belong to Venezuela, was not a matter that affected the interests of the United States one way or the other or that threatened the permanence or stability of American institutions.
(5) That granting the wisdom and correctness of the President's position, the language of his message and of Mr. Olney's dispatch was indiscreet at best and unnecessarily offensive to British pride.
It may be well to consider these objections in detail. In regard to the first point it may be said that neither President Cleveland nor Mr. Olney asserted or maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was a part of international law by virtue of its assertion by President Monroe and succeeding presidents. The position they took was that the Monroe Doctrine was an American statement of a well recognized principle of international law, viz., the right of a state to intervene in a controversy between other states, when it deems its own interests threatened. Mr. Cleveland declared: "The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced." Mr. Olney's analysis of the doctrine was clearer and more specific. He said: "That there are circumstances under which a nation may justly intervene in a controversy to which two or more other nations are the direct and immediate parties is an admitted canon of international law." After discussing the general principle of intervention, he adds: "We are concerned at this time, however, not so much with the general rule as with a form of it which is peculiarly and distinctively American."[246]