Suppose, however, that ends are independently suggested or proposed, will the Kantian conception serve to _test_ their moral fitness? Will the conception that the end must be capable of being generalized tell us whether this or that end is one to be followed? The fact is, that there is no end whatever that _in or by itself_, cannot be considered as self-identical, or as universal. If we presuppose a certain rule, or if we presuppose a certain moral order, it may be true that a given motive cannot be universalized without coming into conflict with this presupposed rule or order. But aside from some moral system into connection with which a proposed end may be brought, for purposes of comparison, lying is just as capable as truth-telling of generalization. There is no more contradiction in the motive of universal stealing than there is in that of universal honesty--unless there is as standard some order or system of things into which the proposed action is to fit as a member. And this makes not the bare universality of the act, but the system, the real criterion for determining the morality of the act.
Thus Mill remarks, regarding Kant's four illustrations (_Ante_, p. 80), that Kant really has to employ utilitarian considerations to decide whether the act is moral or not.
For the foregoing criticisms, see Bradley, Ethical Studies, Essay IV; Caird, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 185-186, and 212-214, and, indeed, the whole of ch. II of Bk. II.
Criticism of Kantian Criterion of Conduct.
2. _With reference to the furnishing of a common good or end._ If the Kantian end is so formal and empty as not to enable us to bring into relation with one another the various acts of one individual, we may agree, without argument, that it does not provide us with an end which shall unify the acts of different men into a connected order of conduct. The moral end, the acting from regard for law as law, is presented to each individual by himself, entirely apart from his relations to others. That he has such relations may, indeed, furnish additional material to which the law must be applied, but is something to which the character of the law is wholly indifferent. The end is not in itself a social end, and it is a mere accident if in any case social considerations have to be taken into account. It is of the very quality of the end that it appeals to the individual as an isolated individual.