Wong Kwok Hing, a pro-China Lawmaker lost his seat in the 2016 election. Photo from Wong's Facebook via HKFP. They say the best laid plans of mice and men often go awry, and for Beijing authorities at the moment, nothing could be truer. Voters, who turned out in record numbers for Hong Kong’s recent legislative election, have ruined the mainland’s hope of stripping Hong Kong’s pan-democrats of their important veto power in the Legislative Council. But there are plenty of other indications that ‘One Country, Two Systems’ understanding that allows Hong Kong significant autonomy from China is under attack. The election results came as something of a surprise even to pan-democrats themselves, who were pessimistic ahead of the vote. They were up against the Hong Kong mainstream media’s hostile attitude toward political opposition candidates, and the pro-Beijing camp was doing all they could to engineer the election. But the pan-democrats – a loose coalition of liberal-minded politicians who advocate democracy in Hong Kong over Chinese-style communism – still managed to win a majority 19 of the 35 seats. By all accounts, it was a small miracle. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, which means it has the freedom to run many of its own affairs. In recent years, however, the mainland has made moves to hobble this autonomy and exert more influence there. Despite the fact that presently 35 of 70 Hong Kong legislators are chosen directly by the people — the other half are selected by special interest groups representing business, religion, etc. — Beijing has found numerous ways to play within the system and influence voting outcomes. One reason the pan-democrats experienced the success they did has was related to the high turnout – 58%. Thanks to the city’s proportional representation electoral system, if the turnout rate had been just four points lower – the same as the 2012 election turnout rate – Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing camp could have won at least 19 seats. Hong Kong legislators are elected using the largest remainder method, which means the number of seats that each party wins depends on the number of total votes cast, the number of votes they personally receive, and the number of seats up for grabs. For example, say 100 votes are cast in an election and there are 10 seats in contest. Party A gets 62 votes, Party B gets 28 and Party C gets 10. To figure out the number of seats each gets, divide each party’s total votes by the number of seats available (10): From this calculation, it is determined that Party A gets 6 seats, Party B gets 2 seats, and Party C gets 1 seat. But 6 + 2 + 1 = 9, so who gets the remaining seat? That’s where the remainder comes in. Whoever has the highest fractional remainder gets the extra seat, which in this case is Party B with 0.8. So in the end, Party A gets 6 seats, Party B gets 3 seats, and Party C gets 1 seat. The system can favor parties and independent candidates with fewer votes. This is part of why in Hong Kong’s Western New Territories, for example, the pro-China camp managed to gain five seats with 266,351 votes, while the pan-democrats only won four seats with 330,107 votes. The pan-democrats received more than 55 percent of the vote in this region, but had to share it among nine candidates, whereas the pro-China votes were only split between five candidates. The China Liaison Office, which represents the mainland in Hong Kong, coordinates the pro-China camp of politicians up for election in Hong Kong, and clearly knows how to maximize the number of winners by distributing candidates throughout the electoral districts. The Liaison Office divides the pro-China camp candidates into different lists, but keeps the number of lists low in order to avoid internal competition from harming the pro-Beijing cause. The pan-democrats are less united, and thus less effective. The pro-China camp's strategy is so efficient that in six constituencies, it made off with 60 percent of the seats despite receiving only 45 percent of the vote. Pro-China candidates who want to run for the Legislative Council also have to get the Liaison Office’s blessing if they want their support in the campaign. But an affinity for Beijing alone isn’t enough. In an example of how the Office plays chess with the electoral system, Hau Chi-keung was forced to leave his community district in the Western New Territories to compete for a seat in the Eastern New Territories.