We will first dispose of the questions presented by the appeal of the United States. In substance, it is asserted that the grant should have been rejected in toto, instead of being confirmed to the extent of 4 sitios, upon the following grounds: 1. That the claim was barred by § 12 of the act establishing the court of private land claims, because not asserted until after the expiration of two years from the passage of the act. True, it is said, the claim of Green was presented in time, but as he was not represented at the trial, and Cameron and Christie were treated as the sole claimants, and they had not by their cross complaints asked for affirmative relief within the statutory limitation, the bar of the statute was operative as to them. 2. The intendant ad interim Bustamente, through whom the sale to Romero and others purported to have been effected, and the commissary general of Sonora who ultimately extended the title, did not possess the power in the premises which they assumed to exercise. 3. The grant in question was not duly located prior to September 25, 1853, as required by article 6 of the Gadsden treaty. 4. The grant was not duly recorded in the archives of Mexico prior to September 25, 1853, which was made a condition precedent to the recognition of an alleged grant, by the article of the treaty just referred to.
As respects the bar of the statute, we think the contention is clearly without merit, even upon the hypothesis that the grant to Romero constituted, at the date of the treaty, but an imperfect title to the extent to which the court below confirmed the same. The provision of the act establishing the court of private land claims, relied upon, is as follows:
'Sec. 12. That all claims mentioned in § 6 of this act which are by the provisions of this act authorized to be prosecuted shall, at the end of two years from the taking effect of this act, if no petition in respect to the same shall have then been filed as hereinbefore provided, be deemed and taken, in all courts and elsewhere, to be abandoned, and shall be forever barred.' [26 Stat. at L. 858, chap. 539.]
By the filing of the petition on behalf of Green the court below was vested with jurisdiction to determine the validity of the grant upon which the proceeding was based, and to pass upon the question as to whether or not the lands embraced therein were at the date of the treaty public land of the United States. The terms of the act establishing the court of private land claims, with reference to a proceeding thus instituted, in our opinion leaves no room for doubt that it was the intention of Congress to require that before a decision by the court in the premises all those asserting claims in the land adverse to the United States, under the grant relied upon, should be made parties and be heard in support of its validity. The provisions of § 6 of the act, which relate to claims for confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles, manifestly import that every adverse possessor or claimant should be made a party defendant, and the section prohibits the entry of a decree 'otherwise than upon full legal proof and hearing.' By § 7 'all proceedings subsequent to the filing of said petition' are required to 'be conducted as near as may be according to the practice of the courts of equity of the United States;' and, in addition, it is provided as follows:
'The said court shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions arising in cases before it relative to the title to the land the subject of such case, the extent, location, and boundaries thereof, and other matters connected therewith fit and proper to be heard and determined, and by a final decree to settle and determine the question of the validity of the title, and the boundaries of the grant or claim presented for adjudication, according to the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty concluded between the United States and the Republic of Mexico, at the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, on the second day of February, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and forty-eight, or the treaty concluded between the same powers at the city of Mexico on the thirtieth day of December, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and fifty-three, and the laws and ordinances of the government from which it is alleged to have been derived, and all other questions properly arising between the claimants or other parties in the case and the United States, which decree shall in all cases refer to the treaty, law, or ordinance under which such claim is confirmed or rejected.'