The Basic Laws of Sweden () are the four constitutional laws of the Kingdom of Sweden that regulate the Swedish political system, acting in a similar manner to the constitutions of most countries.

These four laws are: the Instrument of Government (), the Freedom of the Press Act (), the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression () and the Act of Succession (). Together, they constitute a basic framework that stands above other laws and regulation, and also define which agreements are themselves above normal Swedish law.

Basic Laws of Sweden

The Parliament Act () is usually considered to be halfway between a fundamental law and a normal law, with certain main chapters afforded similar protections as the fundamental laws while other additional chapters require only a simple parliamentary majority in order to be amended.

Basic Laws of Sweden

To amend or to revise a fundamental law, the Riksdag needs to approve the changes twice in two successive terms with simple majorities, with a general election having been held in between. The first vote can be supplemented with a referendum.

Basic Laws of Sweden

Instrument of Government

The most important of the fundamental laws is the Instrument of Government (). It sets out the basic principles for political life in Sweden defining rights and freedoms.

The 1974 Instrument of Government grants the power to commission a prime minister to the Riksdag, at the nomination of the Speaker of the Riksdag, who following a vote in the Riksdag signs the letter of commission on behalf of the Riksdag. The prime minister is appointed when the majority of the Riksdag does not vote against the nominee, thus making it possible to form minority governments. The prime minister appoints members of the government, including heads of ministries. The government collectively decides on issues after hearing the report of the head of the ministry concerned. At least five members of the government need to be present for a decisional quorum to be made. In practice, reports are written and discussions very rare during formal cabinet meetings.

Constitutional functions for the head of state, i.e., the monarch, include heading the cabinet councils (the king plus the members of the government), heading the Council on Foreign Affairs, recognizing new cabinets (in the Council of State), and opening the annual session of the Riksdag. The monarch is to be continually briefed on governmental issues—in the Council of State or directly by the prime minister.

The first constitutional Instrument of Government was enacted in 1719, marking the transition from autocracy to parliamentarism. Sweden's bloodless coup d'état of 1772 was legitimized by the Riksdag of the Estates in new versions of the Instrument of Government, Swedish Constitution of 1772 and the Union and Security Act from 1789, making the king a "constitutional autocrat". When the ancient Swedish land in 1809 was split into two parts, and the Grand Duchy of Finland was created as an autonomous part of the Russian Empire, this constitutional autocracy was not formally abolished or replaced. Finland gained independence as a republic in 1917, and its parliament used the Swedish Constitution of 1772 as legal basis to operate until the country adopted its new constitution in 1919.

In Sweden, the loss of virtually half the realm led to another bloodless revolution, a new royal dynasty, and the Instrument of Government of 6 June 1809 (as well as a new Freedom of Press Act and Act of Succession). The new Instrument of Government established a separation of powers between the executive branch (the king) and the legislative branch (the Riksdag of the Estates) and gave the king and the Riksdag of the Estates joint power over legislation, with the king still playing a central role in government but no longer independently of the Privy Council. The king was free to choose councillors, but was bound to decide on governmental matters only in presence of the Privy Council, or a subset thereof, and after report of the councillor responsible for the matter in question. The councillor had to countersign a royal decision, unless it was unconstitutional, whereby it gained legal force. The councillor was legally responsible for his advice and was obliged to note his dissension in case he did not agree with the king's decision. This constitution placed considerable de jure power in the king, but it was increasingly exercised in accordance with his councillors' advice. From 1917, the king adhered to principles of parliamentarism by choosing councillors possessing direct or indirect support from a majority of the Riksdag.