Yet the cities of the Greeks were essentially weakened by the war and their subjugation. In Phocaea, it is true, a community again grew up. Half of the emigrants, in spite of their solemn vow, were seized with a longing for their ancient home; they returned to their desolated city. But for fifty years after this time the new Phocaea would or could furnish no more than three ships of war. In Priene also and Teos sufficient inhabitants gradually assembled to establish small communities.[46] Other circumstances weighed more heavily even than their natural losses. Cyrus knew well that it would not be easy to retain in secure obedience cities so distant in situation, so important in population and military resources. At such a distance isolated garrisons would have been exposed to great danger; yet without them the cities would have closed their gates to the Persians at any moment, manned their walls, and entered into combinations beyond the sea. Every rebellion of this kind made new sieges necessary, and these were the more difficult as Persia had no fleet, and could only use the ships of the Greeks. Situated at the extreme edge of the kingdom, and supported by the opposite shore of the Ægean, each of the larger cities could offer a long resistance. With the unerring political insight which distinguished him, Cyrus saw that he must gain adherents within the cities, and have on his side influential interests of sufficient weight to keep the cities in obedience. Yet he did not aim at supporting one or other of the parties who contended in the Greek cities for the leadership of the community; on the other hand, his favour and that of his viceroys was given to this or that party-leader. His allegiance was to be secured and certain advantages were held out in prospect to the city when led by him. Cyrus intended to govern the cities of the Greeks by Greeks, who were not to be his officers, but to rule the cities as their lords and princes for their own advantage and profit. By their position, which they owed to the favour of Persia, and could only maintain with the help of Persia against their fellow-citizens, by the interested desire to retain this power in their families and bequeath it to their children, by the concentration of the princely authority, as opposed to the republican institutions and republican spirit of their cities--which authority rested on the Persian court, and was closely connected with it--these rulers in union with the viceroys and their troops must be in a position to secure the subjection of the cities. Thus it came to pass that not in Cyme only, the most important city of the Aeolians, but in almost all the towns of the Greeks, men were raised to power by the favour and support of the Persian satraps, who managed the public affairs, and in the place of autonomous communities came despotisms and principalities, in reality if not in name. How correct Cyrus was is proved by the result.[47] He was able to secure the obedience of the Lydians also. He caused the land to be stripped of its arms, even to the extent of taking away the cavalry horses,[48] and so abandoned all thought of forcing the Lydians to serve in his army. The disuse of arms and the lapse of time did their work, aided as they were by a vigorous trade, which in Lydia was due not only to the natural wealth and the gold of the soil, but to a long-established and skilful industry. In these pursuits and a luxurious life the Lydians forgot their old days and ancient deeds. Persia had never again to contend with a rebellion of the Lydians.