[Footnote 2: Mahan, NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 412.]
[Illustration: ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCT. 18, 1904-MAY 27, 1905]
The main Russian fighting force entered the battle in three divisions of 4 ships each: (1) the _Suvaroff_ (flagship), _Alexander III, Borodino_ and _Orel_, each a new battleship of about 13,600 tons; (2) the _Ossliabya_, a slightly smaller battleship, and three armored cruisers; (3) Nebogatoff's division as given above, with the exception of the cruiser. Then there was a squadron of 4 smaller cruisers, 4 other cruisers as scouts, and 9 destroyers. The Japanese engaged in two main divisions of 6 ships each (4 battleships and 8 armored cruisers), backed by four light cruiser divisions of 4 ships each. The Russian line had the advantage in heavy ordnance, as will appear from the following table, but this was more than compensated for by the enemy's superiority in 8-inch guns and quick-firers, which covered the Russians with an overwhelming rain of shells. Of guns in broadside, the Japanese ships-of-the-line had 127 to 98; and the cruisers 89 to 43.
-------------------------------------------------- | | MAIN BATTERIES | Q.F. | |---------------------|------------ | Ships | 12" | 10" | 9" | 8" | 6" | 4·7" -------|-------|-----|-----|----|----|-----|------ Japan | 12 | 16 | 1 | | 30 | 160 | Russia | 12 | 26 | 15 | 4 | 3 | 90 | 20
On the basis of these figures, and the 50% superiority of the Japanese in speed, the issue could hardly be in doubt. Admiral Togo, moreover, had commanded his fleet in peace and war for 8 years, and had veteran subordinates on whom he could depend to lead their divisions independently yet in coordination with the general plan. Constant training and target practice had brought his crews to a high degree of skill. The Japanese shells were also superior, with fuses that detonated their charges on the slightest contact with an explosive force like that of mines. Between the enemy and their base, the Japanese could wait quietly in home waters, while the Russian fleet was worn out by its eight months' cruise. At best, the latter was a heterogeneous assemblage of new ships hastily completed and old ships indifferently put in repair, which since Nebogatoff joined had had but one opportunity for maneuvers and had operated as a unit for only 13 days.