After quoting the above extracts from my report, M. Roslavleff says:
“Thus warmly, eloquently, and shrewdly did Kuropatkin condemn the Ya-lu adventure, and thus clearly did he see on the political horizon the ruinous consequences that it would have for Russia. But why did this bold and clear-sighted censor not protest against the decision of the Port Arthur council? Why, after making a few caustic remarks about Bezobrazoff, did he sign the paper which put the Ya-lu adventure under the protection of Russian troops, and thus stop the evacuation of Manchuria? Why did not the other members, who shared Kuropatkin’s opinion as to the great danger of Bezobrazoff’s adventurous schemes, and expected a rupture with Japan to be imminent, prevent, on the authority of those July councils at Port Arthur, Bezobrazoff’s political and economic escapades? Why did they, on the contrary, with Kuropatkin, put their signatures to a document which admitted Bezobrazoff’s enterprises as useful Government undertakings, ratify a treacherous policy in China, Korea, and Japan, and so lay the first stone in the monument of indelible shame erected by the war? Why? Simply because at that time everybody was afraid of Bezobrazoff.”
Such accusations, which have had wide publicity, require an explanation.
The council held at Port Arthur, in June, 1903, was called for the purpose of finding, if possible, some means of settling the Manchurian question without lowering the dignity of Russia. There were present at this council, in addition to Admiral Alexeieff and myself, Acting State Councillor Lessar, Russian Minister in China; Chamberlain Pavloff, Russian Minister in Seoul; Major-General Vogak; State Councillor Bezobrazoff; and M. Plancon, an officer of the diplomatic service. We were all acquainted with the wish of the Emperor, that our enterprises in the Far East should not lead to war, and we had to devise means of carrying the Imperial will into effect. With regard to these means there were differences of opinion, but upon fundamental questions there was complete agreement. Among these were—
1. _The Manchurian Question._—On July 3 the council expressed its judgment with regard to this question as follows: “In view of the extraordinary difficulties and enormous administrative expenses that the annexation of Manchuria would involve, all the members of the council agree that it is, in principle, undesirable; and this conclusion applies not only to Manchuria as a whole, but also to its northern part.”