As the business of courts of equity became more enlarged and more methodical,--as magistrates, for a long series of years, presided in the Court of Chancery, who were not bred to the Common Law,--as commerce, with its advantages and its necessities, opened a communication more largely with other countries,--as the Law of Nature and Nations (always a part of the law of England) came to be cultivated,--as an increasing empire, as new views and new combinations of things were opened,--this antique rigor and overdone severity gave way to the accommodation of human concerns, for which rules were made, and not human concerns to bend to them.
At length, Lord Hardwicke, in one of the cases the most solemnly argued, that has been in man's memory, with the aid of the greatest learning at the bar, and with the aid of all the learning on the bench, both bench and bar being then supplied with men of the first form, declared from the bench, and in concurrence with the rest of the Judges, and with the most learned of the long robe, the able council on the side of the old restrictive principles making no reclamation, "that the judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but ONE general rule of evidence,--_the best that the nature of the case will admit_."[51] This, then, the master rule, that governs all the subordinate rules, does in reality subject itself and its own virtue and authority _to the nature of the case_, and leaves no rule at all of an independent, abstract, and substantive quality. Sir Dudley Ryder, (then Attorney-General, afterwards Chief-Justice,) in his learned argument, observed, that "it is extremely proper that there should be _some_ general rules in relation to evidence; but _if exceptions were not allowed to them, it would be better to demolish all the general rules_. There is no general rule without exception that we know of but this,--that _the best evidence shall be admitted which the nature of the case will afford_. I will show that rules as general as this are broke in upon _for the sake of allowing evidence_. There is no rule that seems more binding than that a man shall not be admitted an evidence in his own case, and yet the Statute of Hue and Cry is an exception. A man's books are allowed to be evidence, or, which is in substance the same, his servant's books, _because the nature of the case requires it_,--as in the case of a brewer's servants. Another general rule, that a wife cannot be witness against her husband, has been broke in upon in cases of treason. Another exception to the general rule, that a man may not be examined without oath,--the last words of a dying man are given in evidence in the case of murder." Such are the doctrines of this great lawyer.