Again, it is curious that seemingly no one in the British Army was aware that the Boers had entrenched positions to the south of the Tugela. Yet their dispositions in the Modder River fight, which had occurred more than a fortnight previously, so that the Staff had had full time to acquaint itself with the details, should have led to the conclusion that it was at least probable there were such entrenchments to the south of the river.

A third cause of the defeat was the utter untrustworthiness of the maps of the district, although Natal had for two generations been a British colony, and though a considerable British garrison had for years been stationed in Ladysmith.

With the Flag to Pretoria — Part 96

Next there were the actual mistakes of generals in the field. And here it should be remembered in extenuation that while the non-combatant of average intelligence, sitting in an armchair, can often point out after the event what ought to have been done, and what was done wrongly, such critics have not to face the storm and excitement of battle, in which men are only too apt to forget or neglect the teaching of history. It is a classical saying that the best general is he who makes the fewest mistakes, and the proverb is itself an admission that mistakes in war are inevitable.

With the Flag to Pretoria — Part 96

[Illustration: THE LATE GENERAL DE VILLEBOIS-MAREUIL

With the Flag to Pretoria — Part 96

Sought out by Dr. Leyds on the outbreak of hostilities, Count de Villebois-Mareuil, who retired from active service in the French Army in 1896, hastened to Africa, and set to work to elaborate a plan of campaign in Natal. He is said to have been responsible for the disposition of the Boers at Colenso and elsewhere on the Tugela, and to have been present and active in directing the repulse of Buller's attack. He was killed in an action near Boshof, in the Orange Free State, where he and some seventy men were surrounded and killed or captured by Lord Methuen, April 5, 1900.]

In their management of the battle the Boers had the assistance and counsel of Colonel de Villebois-Mareuil, a French officer of distinction, who, at a huge salary, had been enlisted to advise their generals. But they paid little or no attention to his counsel. At the time it was supposed that the Boer victory was largely to be attributed to him. We now know that it was due to the errors of the British War Office and the mistakes of the British generals.