On the 7th of September, Sullivan crossed the outlet of the Seneca Lake, and moved in three divisions upon the town of Kanadaseagea--the Seneca capital--containing about sixty houses, with gardens, and numerous orchards of apple and peach trees. It was Sullivan's object to surround the town, and take it by surprise. But, although Butler had endeavored to induce the Indians to make a stand at that place, his importunities were of no avail. They said it was of no use to contend with such an army; and their capital was consequently abandoned, as the other towns had been, before the Americans could reach it. A detachment of four hundred men was sent down on the west side of the lake, to destroy Gotheseunquean, [FN-1] and the plantations in the neighborhood; while at the same time a number of volunteers, under Colonel Harper, made a forced march in the direction of the Cayuga Lake, and destroyed Schoyere. Meantime the residue of the army was employed, on the 8th, in the destruction of the town, together with the fruit-trees, and fields of corn and beans. [FN-2] Here, as elsewhere, the work of destruction was thorough and complete.
[FN-1] Thus spelled by General Sullivan, whose official account is in part the basis of this narrative. Captain Theodosius Fowler, in his diary, writes it Karhauguash.
In leaving their town, the Indians had fled with such precipitancy that a young white male child, about seven or eight years old, was left behind, asleep. It was taken in charge by an officer, who, from ill health, was not on duty. In retiring from the campaign, for the same cause, he took the child with him, and nothing more of its history is known. This flight of the Indians was universal; and of all commanders, Sullivan seems to have been least successful in finding the enemy of whom he was in search, save only when the enemy wished to be found. Upon this feature of the present campaign it has been remarked, that although the bravery of this officer was unimpeachable, yet he was altogether unacquainted with the science of Indian warfare, and was sure to use the best means to keep the savages at such a distance, that they could not be brought unwillingly to an engagement. For instance, he persisted in the practice of having cannon fired from his camp, mornings and evenings, forgetting what every one else perceived, that the Indians were thus notified of his position and the rapidity of his marches--thus being enabled daily to retreat from his approach exactly in time. [FN]