And the right way, for the positivists, as for the Christians, is an inward way 80

The moral end is a certain inward state of the heart, and the positivists say it is a sufficient attraction in itself, without any aid from religion 81

Is Life Worth Living? — Part 5

And they support this view by numerous examples 82

Is Life Worth Living? — Part 5

Because though we may get rid of religion in its pure form 83

Is Life Worth Living? — Part 5

There is much that we have not got rid of, embodied still in the moral end 84

To test the intrinsic value of the end, we must sublimate this religion out of it 86

For this purpose we will consider, first, the three general characteristics of the moral end, viz. 88

Now all these three characteristics can be explained by religion 93

The positive moral end must therefore be completely divested of them 100

The next question is, will it be equally attractive then? 100

The positivists represent love as a thing whose value is self-dependent 101

And which gives to life a positive and incalculable worth 103

But this is supposed to be true of one form of love only 104

And the very opposite is supposed to hold good of all other forms 105

The right form depends on the conformity of each of the lovers to a certain inward standard 105

As we can see exemplified in the case of Othello and Desdemona, etc. 107

The kind and not the degree of the love is what gives love its special value 108

And the selection of this kind can be neither made nor justified on positive principles 109

As the following quotations from Théophile Gautier will show us 110

Which are supposed by many to embody the true view of love 110

According to this view, purity is simply a disease both in man and woman, or at any rate no merit 116

If love is to be a moral end, this view must be absolutely condemned 117

But positivism cannot condemn it, or support the opposite view 117

As we shall see by recurring to Professor Huxley's argument 118

Which will show us that all moral language as applied to love is either distinctly religious or else altogether ludicrous 122

For it is clearly only on moral grounds that we can give that blame to vice, which is the measure of the praise we give to virtue 123

The misery of the former depends on religious anticipations 124

And so does also the blessedness of the latter 125