The best of leaders, however, will only be capable of great performances if he is fully acquainted with the intentions of the Head Quarters and the idea of the battle. He must therefore be not only closely informed before the fight, but must remain throughout its progress in continual communication with the Head Quarters, and must be made aware of all dispositions and at the same time must share its observations and be in touch with its intentions. The German cavalry would certainly have been able to fight a more successful and connected action at Mars la Tour, as at Coulmiers, if it had been better informed as to the general situation, and had thus been in a position to appreciate for itself what was necessary and what was possible.
If, however, understanding between the commander-in-chief and the leader of the cavalry is established, and if full confidence in the judgment and energy of the latter exists, he must be allowed that necessary freedom and independence which alone ensure successful action. On the other hand, he should never wait for orders to intervene, but must himself turn any favourable moments of the fight to account by rapid and energetic independent action. Even if he is definitely placed at the disposal of the commander, he should not shrink at critical moments from acting on his own responsibility, informing, of course, his superior officer of his actions. As an example of the relations between the supreme command and the cavalry leader I would draw attention to the conduct of King Frederick and General von Seydlitz in the battle of Zorndorf. The King felt the necessity of restoring the wavering fortunes of the day by launching the cavalry to the attack, but Seydlitz independently chose the moment for the charge; and success justified them both. When, however, in the battle of Kunersdorf, the General was compelled to order the charge against his better judgment, the consequences were a heavy defeat for the cavalry.
1. _The Army Cavalry on the Flank of the Battle_
I have already repeatedly indicated that the most favourable position for the army cavalry is to a flank and in advance of a flank of its own army, and, where possible, of _that_ flank on which, in the battle of offence, the decision will be sought, or, when in defence, the main hostile attack may be expected.[40] The new Cavalry Regulations adopt this point of view. It is therefore superfluous to comment further on the advantages of such a position. Unless the cavalry is going to resign all claim to offensive action, this position will compel it to seek battle. This may also happen when the cavalry masses of _both_ sides endeavour to take up such a position, and thereby naturally come into collision, so that a sort of battle of encounter results, but one, however, that will bear quite a different character from the battle of encounter in strategic operations.