“In retreating, the movement to the rear of large masses together afforded the enemy a splendid target, for which we suffered. Again, to avoid unnecessary loss in retirement, portions of a position have often been stubbornly held until a withdrawal could be effected under cover of darkness. If the portion of ground on either side happens to have been already abandoned, and the Japanese are sufficiently mobile to make use of it, such isolated defence of any one section of a position might cost very dear. We must learn how to retire by day—by the same methods as laid down above for the attack (by rushes), and avoid close formations in doing it.

“I and other senior officers have noticed during an action hundreds and thousands of unwounded men leaving the ranks, carrying wounded to the rear. In the fights of October 12 to 15[8] I personally saw wounded men being carried to the rear by as many as nine others. This abuse must be put down with the utmost rigour, and until an action is over only the stretcher-bearers should take wounded to the rear.

The Russian army and the Japanese War, Volume II — Part 13

“The Japanese are fortifying the positions along our front, converting villages, knolls, and hill-tops into strong, defensible points, and strengthening their positions with obstacles. These positions should be carefully studied, their strong points noted, and in every section of our line a plan of possible operations against the corresponding portions of the enemy’s position should be made. The early organization of the artillery preparation of any attack on these selected points is important.

The Russian army and the Japanese War, Volume II — Part 13

“Detachments of sappers and scouts should be sent ahead of the assault to destroy the obstacles round fortified villages, which should be well shelled. Till the assault is made the advance should be under cover, and if the leading troops find they are not strong enough to capture the point on which they have been directed, they must hold on to a point as near to the enemy as possible, in order to press forward again when reinforced.”

The Russian army and the Japanese War, Volume II — Part 13

Finally, in my instructions issued in December, 1904, I recapitulated the most important points brought out by our recent experiences, such as—

“1. The necessity, in order to avoid loss, for our attack formations to be better adapted to the ground.