A little later, after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and in the course of Congressional discussion of the Panama Congress, it was emphatically stated in the Senate that, because of the great interest in the United States in Cuba, there ought to be no discussion with other powers concerning the destiny of that island, particularly with Colombia and Mexico, which were then contemplating the invasion of Cuba in order to take her forcibly from Spain. The British government, in August, 1825, proposed to the United States government, through its minister in London, that the United States, Great Britain and France should unite in a treaty engagement that none of them would take Cuba for itself or permit of the taking of it by either of the others. This proposal was promptly rejected by the United States. One of the grounds for her rejection of it was that such action guaranteeing Spain her possession of Cuba would encourage her to prolong indefinitely her struggle with her other American colonies. Another was that this country had already declared that it did not mean to seize Cuba for itself, and that it would not permit its seizure by any other power. The United States apparently did not fear that Great Britain would attempt to seize the island, since for her to do so would mean a rupture with the United States, which was at that time the last thing that the British government desired. There was much more cause to fear that France might attempt to take forcible possession of Cuba, and the suspicion that she might do so was strengthened by the fact that while, at first, she indicated a willingness to enter into the arrangement proposed by Great Britain, she suddenly changed her attitude, and refused to do so. As a result of this change of front on the part of France, the United States government, in September, 1825, instructed its minister at Paris to inform the French government that under no contingency, either with or without the consent of Spain, would the United States permit France to occupy Cuba.
Scarcely less marked was the opposition of the United States to any scheme for the acquirement of Cuba by any of the American republics. It was notorious that both Colombia and Mexico had designs upon Cuba. These were not so much that either of these countries should acquire the island for itself, but that Cuba and Porto Rico should, nilly willy, be taken away from Spain and made independent, and that thus Spain should be deprived of her last foothold in the Western hemisphere. This purpose was cherished, not only as a matter of sentiment, but as one of prudence. Spain was still trying to reconquer her revolted American provinces, and her possession of Cuba, of course, afforded her an admirable base for such operations. But the United States government took the ground that any such intervention in Cuba would make it much more difficult to secure Spanish recognition of the independence of the Central and South American States. In addition, there was undoubtedly--indeed it was very openly, emphatically and repeatedly expressed--the unwillingness of the slaveholding southern states of the United States to see Cuba made free soil, as the other Spanish colonies had been. It was because of the former consideration, however, that the American Secretary of State, Henry Clay, immediately after the rejection of the British proposal for a tripartite guarantee, addressed a note to the governments of Colombia and Mexico, urging them to refrain from sending the expeditions which they were fitting out against the Spanish power in Cuba. To this request, the Colombian government promptly acceded, and so informed not only the United States, but also the government of Russia, which was, at that time, endeavoring to mediate between Spain and her late American colonies. The Mexican government did not receive the request so favorably, though it did withhold the threatened expedition.