It may happen in exceptional cases, under modern conditions, that the larger bodies of cavalry, accompanied by a proportion of other arms, are unable at the moment of collision to employ them--_e.g._ in close country. There may then be a purely cavalry fight on a large scale, and action must of course be taken according to the tactical principles involved. Early deployment, maintenance of exterior lines, rapid decision, are, as regards the leading, the important factors of success.
It is quite another matter where co-operation of the other arms can be seriously counted on. It is then chiefly the artillery which will set its stamp upon the development of the fight, and it will no longer be possible to act according to purely cavalry tactical principles. A brigade or division, in column of route, or even in several formed columns, if exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, will suffer such material and moral loss that such formations, unless compelled by circumstances, are particularly to be avoided. Whoever is obliged to effect the deployment of his force under the enemy's guns casts from him one of the most important elements of success.
It will therefore be necessary, when advancing against the enemy, to adopt the approach formation, and to seek cover as soon as it is calculated that the hostile artillery are within effective range. In order rightly to calculate this moment the enemy's probable advance must of course be taken into consideration, and, as this may vary greatly according to the pace adopted, it is advisable in this respect not to be too optimistic, but to be deployed rather too early than too late.
Taking into consideration the range of modern artillery, the deployment should commence, therefore, in open country, at latest when some 6,500 yards from the enemy.[28] As this distance will diminish very quickly when the opponents are both rapidly advancing, it will certainly be advisable, if the knowledge of the situation in any way allows, to take up the required breadth of front still earlier.
I would here lay down that a too rapid advance of our own troops, unless rendered necessary by the situation, is in no way advantageous. It is not generally a question of striking the enemy as far to the front as possible, but of striking surely, and of having sufficient strength in hand to annihilate him in the pursuit.