The case presents apparently contradictory decisions between two Secretaries of the Interior, and, plaintiff contends, upon the same set of facts. But this contention is not sustained by the record. The first decision of the local office was adverse to the plaintiff, but the decision was reversed by the Interior Department, the Commissioner and the Secretary of the Interior taking a different view of the facts from that taken by the local land office. But a rehearing was granted, and while, in the opinion granting it, the Secretary repeated his view of the facts, further testimony was allowed to be introduced. Further testimony was introduced, and the local office found that, while it was conflicting,--'the preponderance of it showed: First, That the contestant settled on the land in controversy on the afternoon of SeptemMessrs. John W. Adams, Kos Harris, and William E. Keith for appellant.
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Messrs. William S.C.line and C. L. Pinkham for appellee.
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Statement by Mr. Justice McKenna: ber 16, 1893; that he put up a flag and commenced a well; that he remained thereon until the 20th of September, 1893; that he returned in October, 1893, and built a small house, put up a few trees, and had some breaking done; that he again went to Kansas in November, 1893, and remained there until February, 1894, when he again returned to the land in controversy and built a large and better house; that he has resided [upon], improved, and cultivated part of the said land from that time to the present; that he has substantially complied with all the requirements of the homestead law.
'Second. We find that his absence from the land from November, 1893, to February, 1894, was excusable because of his financial and physical condition.
* * * * *
'Fourth. We find that there was no fraud in conveying the land formerly owned by the contestant to his son-in-law some months before the opening of the country to settlement.
'Fifth. That the settlement rights of the contestant were commenced before the defendant filed his soldier's declaratory statement, and that the said rights so acquired have been followed up as required by law.'
The office recommended that the entry of the defendant 'be permitted to stand.' The finding and decision were successively affirmed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior, in an elaborate opinion, in which the testimony was quoted and commented upon. And to these decisions we must look as the ultimate action of the Department. It is of no legal consequence that different views were expressed in other decisions. It is not contended that Secretary Hitchcock, when he rendered the last decision, did not have complete jurisdiction of the case. It seems to be contended that he was bound by the facts found by his predecessor, Mr. Bliss, and that this court is likewise so bound. The contention is untenable. Potter v. Hall, 189 U.S. 292, 47 L. ed. 817, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 545. In that case it was said:
'The fact that the final conclusion as to the ultimate facts reached by the Department differed from the conception of such ultimate facts entertained by the Department in previous stages of the controversy affords no ground for disregarding the conclusion of ultimate fact finally reached, which was binding between the parties.'
But besides, as we have seen, additional testimony was taken. It was upon that testimony, as well as upon that which was before Secretary Bliss, that the decision of Secretary Hitchcock was based. It is true the petition alleges that such decision was made upon 'precisely the same state of facts' as that of Secretary Bliss, but the allegation is contradicted by the exhibits which are attached to the petition and expressly made part thereof.