Whatever might have been the prevailing opinion, as to the legality of such a proceeding, the ridicule attaching to it would effectually have prevented any remedy--most men being willing to forgive a little irregularity, for the sake of substantial justice and "a good joke." But the summary course, adopted by these magistrates, sometimes worked even greater injustice--as might have been expected; and of this, the following is an example:--
About the year eighteen hundred and twenty-six, there lived, in a certain part of the west, a man named Smedley, who, so far as the collection of debts was concerned, was entirely "law-proof." He seemed to have a constitutional indisposition to paying anything he owed: and, though there were sundry executions in the hands of officers against him--and though he even seemed thrifty enough in his pecuniary affairs--no property could ever be found, upon which they could be levied. There was, at the same time, a constable in the neighborhood, a man named White, who was celebrated, in those days of difficult collections, for the shrewdness and success of his official exploits; and the justice upon whom he usually attended, was equally remarkable, for the high hand with which he carried his authority. But, though two executions were placed in the hands of the former, upon judgments on the docket of the latter, months passed away, without anything being realized from the impervious defendant, Smedley.
Whenever the constable found him in possession of property, and made a levy, it was proven to belong to some one else; and the only result of his indefatigable efforts, was the additions of heavy costs to the already hopeless demand.
At length, however, White learned that Smedley had _traded horses_ with a man named Wyatt, and he straightway posted off to consult the magistrate. Between them, the plan of operations was agreed upon. White levied first upon the horse then in the possession of Smedley, taking him under _one_ of the two writs: he then levied _the other_ execution upon the horse which Smedley had traded to Wyatt. The latter, apprehending the loss of his property, claimed the first horse--that which he had traded to Smedley. But, upon the "trial of the right of property," the justice decided that the horse was found in the possession of Smedley, and was, therefore, subject to levy and sale. He was accordingly sold, and the first judgment was satisfied. Wyatt then claimed the _second_ horse--that which he had received from Smedley. But, upon a similar "trial"--after severely reprimanding Wyatt for claiming _both_ horses, when, on his own showing, he never owned but _one_--the justice decided that the property in dispute had been in the possession of Smedley at the rendition of the judgment, and was therefore, like the other, subject to a lien, and equally liable to levy and sale! And accordingly, this horse, also, was sold, to satisfy the second execution, and Wyatt was dismissed by the justice, with no gentle admonition, "to be careful in future with whom he swapped horses!" A piece of advice which he probably took, and for which he ought to have been duly grateful! Fallen humanity, however, is very perverse; and it is at least supposable, that, having lost his horse, he considered himself hardly used--an opinion in which my legal readers will probably concur.