It is doubtful whether any speaking for Buncombe in the halls of Congress or any spouting of an ignorant bumpkin in the moot-court of an American law-school ever produced such a rhetorical hotchpotch of “matter and impertinency mixed” as the earnest plea, of which the above is a brief abstract.
Rather more to the point, but equally overburdened with legal lore and literary pedantry, is the rejoinder of the counsel for the insects:
“Gentlemen, inasmuch as you have chosen me to defend these little beasts (_bestioles_), I shall, an it please you, endeavour to right them and to show that the manner of proceeding against them is invalid and void. I confess that I am greatly astonished at the treatment they have been subjected to and at the charges brought against them, as though they had committed some crime. Thus information has been procured touching the damage said to have been done by them; they have been summoned to appear before this court to answer for their conduct, and, since they are notoriously dumb, the judge, wishing that they should not suffer wrong on account of this defect, has appointed an advocate to speak in their behalf and to set forth in conformity with right and justice the reasons, which they themselves are unable to allege.
“Since you have permitted me to appear in defence of these poor animals, I will state, in the first place, that the summons served on them is null and void, having been issued against beasts, which cannot and ought not to be cited before this judgment seat, inasmuch as such a procedure implies that the parties summoned are endowed with reason and volition and are therefore capable of committing crime. That this is not the case with these creatures is clear from the paragraph _Si quadrupes_, etc., in the first book of the Pandects, where we find these words: _Nec enim potest animal injuriam fecisse, quod sensu caret_.
“The second ground, on which I base the defence of my clients, is that no one can be judicially summoned without cause, and whoever has had such a summons served renders himself liable to the penalty prescribed by the statute _De poen. tem. litig._ As regards these animals there is no _causa justa litigandi_; they are not bound in any manner, _non tenentur ex contractu_, being incompetent to make contracts or to enter into any compact or covenant whatsoever, _neque ex quasi contractu_, _neque ex stipulatione_, _neque ex pacto_, and still less _ex delicto seu quasi_, can there be any question of a delict or any semblance thereof, since, as has just been shown, the rational faculties essential to the capability of committing criminal actions are wanting.