(6) But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of _vita brevis_, _ars longa_; which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences. For knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. As for the vertical point, _opus quod operatur Deus à principio usque ad finem_, the summary law of nature, we know not whether man’s inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better than the giants’ hills:—

“Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam, Scilicet atque Ossæ frondsum involvere Olympum.”

The Advancement of Learning — Part 69

But to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the three acclamations, _Sante_, _sancte_, _sancte_! holy in the description or dilatation of His works; holy in the connection or concatenation of them; and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And, therefore, the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be metaphysic; as that which considereth the simple forms or differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety. The second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysic, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physic carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many accidents and impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature. But _latæ undique sunt sapientibus viæ_; to sapience (which was anciently defined to be _rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia_) there is ever a choice of means. For physical causes give light to new invention in _simili materia_. But whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less restrained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the condition of the efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a more divine sense, elegantly describeth: _non arctabuntur gressus tui_, _et currens non habebis offendiculum_. The ways of sapience are not much liable either to particularity or chance.

The Advancement of Learning — Part 69