Further, I argue thus: If the civil officer of state must determine, judge, and punish in spiritual causes, his power, authority, and commission must be either spiritual or civil, or else he hath none at all: and so acts without a commission and warrant from the Lord Jesus; and so, consequently, [he] stands guilty at the bar of Christ Jesus, to answer for such his practice as a transcendent delinquent.
[Sidenote: The civil magistrate confessed to have no civil power over the souls of men: nor spiritual.]
Now for civil power, these worthy authors confess that the government of the civil magistrate extendeth no further than over the bodies and goods of the subject, and therefore hath no civil power over the soul, and therefore, say I, not in soul-causes.
_Secondly._ It is here confessed, in this passage, that to attain his civil end, or _bonum temporale_, he hath no spiritual power; and therefore, of necessity, out of their own mouths must they be judged for provoking the magistrate, without either civil or spiritual power, to judge, punish, and persecute in spiritual causes; and to fear and tremble, lest they come near those frogs which proceed out of the mouth of the dragon, and beast, and false prophet, who, by the same arguments which the authors here use, stir up the kings of the earth to make war against the Lamb, Christ Jesus, and his followers, Rev. xvii. 14.
In the next place, I observe upon the point of delinquency, such a conclusion as heaven and earth may stand amazed at. If the church offend, say they, after advice refused, in conclusion the magistrate must redress, that is punish the church, that is in church offences and cases, by a course of civil justice.
On the other side, if the civil magistrate offend after admonition used, and not prevailing, in conclusion the church proceeds to censure, that is to excommunication, as is afterward more largely proved by them.
[Sidenote: The magistrate and the church, by the author’s grounds, at one and the same time, in one and the same cause, made the judges on the bench and delinquents at the bar.]
Now I demand, if the church be a delinquent, who shall judge? It is answered, the magistrate. Again, if the magistrate be a delinquent, I ask who shall judge? It is answered, the church. Whence I observe—which is monstrous in all cases in the world—that one person, to wit, the church or magistrate, shall be at one time the delinquent at the bar and the judge upon the bench. This is clear thus: The church must judge when the magistrate offends; and yet the magistrate must judge when the church offends. And so, consequently, in this case [the magistrate] must judge, whether she contemn civil authority in the second table, for thus dealing with him: or whether she have broken the rules of the first table, of which (say they) God hath made him keeper and conserver. And therefore, though the church make him a delinquent at the bar, yet by their confession God hath made him a judge on the bench. What blood, what tumults, have been and must be spilt upon these grounds?