There has been much discussion as to whether, in districts where martial law has not been proclaimed, a person can be sent for trial from such district into a district where martial law was in operation. It is argued that if the ordinary courts were open and at work in the non-proclaimed district recourse should be had to them. The Privy Council in 1902 (_re_ Marais) refused leave to appeal where the Supreme Court of Cape Colony had declined to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus in these circumstances. Mr Justice Blackburn in his charge in _R._ v. _Eyre_ says, "I have come to the conclusion that, looking at what martial law was, the bringing of a person into the proclaimed district to be tried might, in a proper case, be justified." The learned judge admits that there should be a power of summary trial, observing all the substantials of justice, in order to stamp out an insurrection by speedy trial.
Whilst martial law is the will of the commanders, and is only limited by the customs of war and the discretion of those who administer it, still, as far as practicable, the procedure of military law is followed, and a military court is held on the same lines as a court-martial. Charges are simply framed without technicalities. The prisoner is present, the evidence of prosecution and prisoner is taken on oath, the proceedings are recorded, and the sentence of the court must be confirmed according to the rules of the Army Act. Sentences of death and penal servitude must be referred to headquarters for confirmation. In the South African War (1899-1902) these limits of procedure were observed, and when possible will always be.
Entering more into detail, the term martial law has been employed in several senses:--(1) As applied to the military forces of the crown, apart from the military law under the old Mutiny Acts, and the present annual Army Acts. (2) As applied to the enemy. (3) As applied to rebels. (4) As applied to civilian subjects who are not in rebellion, but in a district where the ordinary course of civil life cannot be maintained owing to war or rebellion.
1. In regard to the military forces of the crown, the superseding of justice as administered under the Army Act could only occur in a time of great need; e.g. mutiny of five or six regiments in the field, with no time to take the opinion of any executive authority. The officer in command would then be bound to take measures for the purpose of suppressing such mutiny, even to putting soldiers to death if necessary. It would be a case where necessity forced immediate action.