[63] "Principles of Psychology," Part VII, Chap. VI, N. Y., 1883, Vol. II, p. 369.
"The question here is--What does consciousness directly testify? And the direct testimony of consciousness is, that Time and Space are not within but without the mind; and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the mind to become non-existent."[64]
[64] "First Principles," Part I, Chap. III, § 15, ed. cit. p. 49.
The moral of the first bit quoted would seem to be, unless we make the word "primarily" refer only to order in time, that one knows immediately what is beyond consciousness and mediately what is in it--a use of words satisfactory, I should think, to no one but Mr. Spencer. If, by "primarily" be meant "previously," and the two classes of being are known in just the same way, why distinguish between the classes? Moreover, in this case a thing would not be known "through" appearances, but before them. Upon the other supposition, to be sure, appearances would be known "through" it--a mode of speaking not in harmony with the language of the "First Principles." It seems a choice between Scylla and Charybdis.
The second extract makes consciousness "directly testify" not only to what is beyond its pale, but, putting on the spirit of prophecy, even to what does not belong to the present, but to a possible future. When we speak of consciousness as testifying to a sensation, we mean simply that the sensation is in consciousness. The word cannot be used in this sense in speaking of what is beyond consciousness. In what sense is it used? It would seem to mean, if it mean anything, that consciousness gives one the right to infer a something beyond--a right which thoughtful men believe should be established by proof. This proof, one cannot, of course, expect from a man who makes the thing beyond consciousness the thing "primarily" known. It would be more consistent in him to attempt a proof that there is something in consciousness.
This complete confusion in Mr. Spencer's mind of things in consciousness and things without, will explain why he keeps talking of his two Absolutes as if there were only one, as if this one were the one of which we are conscious, and yet as if this one were beyond consciousness. His pages swarm with illustrations which I might give. I shall give only the following: "Thus the consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer; and must eventually be freed from its imperfections."[65] If Mr. Spencer ever comes to a consciousness that sameness in sense seventh is not sameness in sense first, he will find work before him in remodeling his doctrine.