The disposition of this case depends upon the construction and application of section 2324 R. S. (U.S.C. title 30, § 28 (30 USCA § 28)), and the effect upon its provisions of section 37 of the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, c. 85, 41 Stat. 437, 451 (U.S.C. title 30, § 193 (30 USCA § 193)). Section 2324 R. S., which has its origin in section 5 of the Mining Act of 1872 (c. 152, 17 Stat. 91, 92 (30 USCA § 28)), provides:
'On each claim located after the 10th day of May, 1872, and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or improvements made during each year. * * * and upon a failure to comply with these conditions, the claim or mine upon which such failure occurred shall be open to relocation in the same manner as if no location of the same had ever been made, provided that the original locators, their heirs, assigns, or legal representatives, have not resumed work upon the claim after failure and before such location.'
By section 2325, R. S. (U.S.C. title 30, § 29 (30 USCA § 29)), provision is made for issuing patents for claims located under the mining laws. One of the prerequisites, and the only one in respect of labor, is that the claimant must show 'that $500 worth of labor has been expended or improvements made upon the claim by himself or grantors.'
The Leasing Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 437) effected a complete change of policy in respect of the disposition of lands containing deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, oil, oil shale, and gas. Such lands were no longer to be open to location and acquisition of title, but only to lease. But section 37 (U.S.C. title 30, § 193 (30 USCA § 193)) contains a saving clause protecting 'valid claims existent at date of the passage of this Act and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated,' and declaring that they 'may be perfected under such laws, including discovery.'
On October 1, 1919, respondent and seven associates, all qualified under the law, located a tract of land in Garfield county, Colo., under the name of Spad No. 3 placer claim. The land contained valuable deposits of oil shale, and was open to appropriation under the mining laws of the United States. Spad No. 3 placer claim formed one of a group of six oil placer claims, numbered Spad No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, all located and owned by the same persons, and lying adjacent to each other. The assessment year 1920, at act of Congress, was extended until July 1, 1921. Prior to that date, annual labor amounting in value, it was asserted, to more than $600 was performed on claims numbered 4, 5, and 6, with the intention that said labor should apply to the entire group.
Subsequently, respondent acquired the interest of his colocators in the Spad No. 3, and, during and for the assessment year 1921, performed thereon assessment labor of an admitted value of more than $100, and continued to perform labor and make improvements on the claim until the aggregate value exceeded $500. On September 25, 1922, he applied for a patent, and, having complied with the statutory requirements and paid the purchase price, obtained final receiver's receipt on December 16, 1922. No relocation of the claim was ever attempted, nor was the valid existence or maintenance of the claim ever challenged in any wise by the United States, or by any one, prior to the issue of the receiver's receipt. Thereafter, a proceeding against the entry was instituted by the Commissioner of the General Land Office; and that officer, after consideration, held the claim null and void upon the sole ground of insufficient assessment labor for the year 1920. This holding was affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior.
In all the proceedings before the land officers amd the Secretary, it was conceded, as it is here conceded, that the claim was valid and existent when the Leasing Act was passed; and that no reason existed, or now exists, for withholding a patent, save the alleged failure of assessment labor for the assessment year 1920. The Secretary held that by such failure all rights to the claim became extinguished and could not be saved or revived by a resumption of work.
Thereupon, respondent applied by petition to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to issue a patent to the claim. After a hearing on rule to show cause, that court discharged the rule and dismissed the petition. Upon appeal this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District. 58 App. D. C. 332, 30 F.(2d) 742.