The Interstate Commerce Act provides that it is unlawful for any person engaged in a business other than transportation to 'transport property by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce for business purposes unless such transportation is within the scope, and in furtherance, of a primary business enterprise (other than transportation) of such person.' § 203(c), 49 U.S.C. § 303(c). Appellees deal in livestock and commodities from a place of business in San Antonio, Texas. They make deliveries in their own trucks to customers in Louisiana and buy sugar at Supreme, Louisiana, which they backhaul 525 miles for resale to customers in San Antonio. The Interstate Commerce Commission held that this backhaul was not exempt under § 203(c) as 'transportation * * * within the scope, and in furtherance, of a primary business enterprise * * *' of appellees, but was 'conducted with the purpose of profiting from the transportation performed, and, as such, constitutes for-hire carriage for which operating authority from this Commission is required.' 81 M.C.C. 337, 347. A three-judge court in the District Court for the Western District of Texas set aside the ICC order. 219 F.Supp. 781. We noted probable jurisdiction. 375 U.S. 901, 84 S.Ct. 197, 11 L.Ed.2d 142. We affirm.
Section 203(c) was designed explicitly to authorize the ICC to eliminate transportation which, though carried on in the guise of private carriage, was in effect for-hire carriage, and thus might lawfully be carried on only by an authorized common or contract carrier. Before the enactment of § 203(c) the ICC was able to reach such abuses by interpreting § 203(a)(17), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(17), so as to exclude such 'pseudo-private' carriage from its definition of a 'private carrier of property by motor vehicle' as a person, not a 'common' or 'contract' carrier, who transports property of which he 'is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.' Many of the cases involved nonauthorized carriers in the transportation business who resorted to transparent 'buy-and-sell' devices to evade ICC regulation. A typical buy-and-sell arrangement is one under which the carrier 'buys' property at a shipping point, transports it to a delivery point and there 'sells' it to the real purchaser, the 'profit' to the carrier amounting to the price of the transportation between the two points. Similar evasions through the use of spurious buy-and-sell agreements were found in cases where property was transported in trucks regularly used by noncarrier businesses to make pickups and deliveries. The ICC was faced with the necessity of determining on the facts of each case whether the transportation constituted private carriage beyond the scope of ICC economic regulation, or for-hire transportation subject to all relevant provisions of the Act. In other words, here, as in United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370, 374, 82 S.Ct. 408, 410, 7 L.Ed.2d 360, in which we dealt with another aspect of the 'pseudo-private' carriage problem, the ICC has also 'had to decide whether a particular arrangement gives rise to that 'for-hire' carriage which is subject to economic regulation in the public interest, or whether it is, in fact, private carriage as to which Congress determined that the (noncarrier's) interest * * * should prevail.'
In the course of discriminating between this pseudo-private carriage and that transportation which was in fact in furtherance of a noncarrier business, the ICC developed the so-called 'primary business' test. This test was first enunciated by the full Commission in Lenoir Chair Co., 51 M.C.C. 65, aff'd, sub nom. Brooks Transportation Co. v. United States, D.C., 93 F.Supp. 517, aff'd, 340 U.S. 925, 71 S.Ct. 501, 95 L.Ed. 668. A chair manufacturer delivered some of its products in its own trucks. Whenever possible, it also used the vehicles to backhaul manufacturing materials for use and processing in its own plant. The ICC concluded, 51 M.C.C., at 76, that the delivery of goods and the backhaul were lawful private carriage because undertaken 'as a bona fide incident to and in furtherance of (its) primary business * * *.' The governing standard was stated as follows, id., at 75: