Sixty years later the Supreme Court, in sustaining the blockade of the Southern ports which Lincoln had instituted in April 1861, at a time when Congress was not in session, adopted virtually the same line of reasoning as Hamilton had advanced. "This greatest of civil wars" said the Court "was not gradually developed * * * it * * * sprung forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of _war_. The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could change the fact."[1223] This doctrine was sharply challenged by a powerful minority of the Court on the ground that while the President could unquestionably adopt such measures as the statutes permitted for the enforcement of the laws against insurgents, Congress alone could stamp an insurrection with the character of war and thereby authorize the legal consequences which ensue a state of war.[1224] Inasmuch as the Court finally conceded that the blockade had been retroactively sanctioned by Congress, that part of its opinion dealing with the power of the President, acting alone, was really _obiter_. But a similar opinion was voiced by Chief Justice Chase on behalf of a unanimous Court, after the war was over. In Freeborn _v._ The "Protector,"[1225] it became necessary to ascertain the exact dates on which the war began and ended in order to determine whether the statute of limitation had run against the asserted claim. To answer this question the Chief Justice said that "it is necessary, therefore, to refer to some public act of the political departments of the government to fix the dates; and, for obvious reasons, those of the executive department, which may be, and, in fact, was, at the commencement of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess of Congress, must be taken. The proclamation of intended blockade by the President may therefore be assumed as marking the first of these dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed, as marking the second."[1226]
The Power To Raise and Maintain Armed Forces
The clauses of the Constitution which give Congress authority "to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy" and so forth, were not inserted for the purpose of endowing the National Government with power to do these things, but rather to designate the department of government which should exercise such powers. Moreover, they permit Congress to take measures essential to the national defense in time of peace as well as during a period of actual conflict. That these provisions grew out of the conviction that the Executive should be deprived of the "sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies" which Blackstone attributed to the King under the British Constitution,[1227] was emphasized by Story in his Commentaries. He wrote: "Our notions, indeed, of the dangers of standing armies, in time of peace, are derived in a great measure from the principles and examples of our English ancestors. In England, the King possessed the power of raising armies in the time of peace according to his own good pleasure. And this prerogative was justly esteemed dangerous to the public liberties. Upon the revolution of 1688, Parliament wisely insisted upon a bill of rights, which should furnish an adequate security for the future. But how was this done? Not by prohibiting standing armies altogether in time of peace; but (as has been already seen) by prohibiting them _without the consent of Parliament_. This is the very proposition contained in the Constitution; for Congress can alone raise armies; and may put them down, whenever they choose."[1228]