The procedure of the Inquisition was directed to procuring conviction rather than justice, and in some respects it bore a resemblance to that of the confessional. The guilt of the accused was assumed, and he was treated as a sinner who was expected to seek salvation by unburdening his conscience and contritely accepting whatever penance might in mercy be imposed on him. Pressure of all kinds, mental and bodily, was scientifically brought to bear upon him to induce confession, and his refusal to confess, in the face of what was considered sufficient evidence, was treated as hardened and pertinacious impenitence, aggravating his guilt and rendering him worthy of the severest penalty.
The arrest, as we have seen, was preceded by careful preliminaries. Evidence was accumulated, in some cases for years, and, when the accused was thrown into the secret prison, he was to a great extent prejudged. It was the business of the tribunal, while preserving outward forms of justice, to bring about either confession or conviction; the defence was limited and embarrassed in every way and, when the outcome of all this was doubt, it was settled in the torture-chamber, always with the reservation that, if suspicion remained, that in itself was a crime deserving due punishment.
In the earliest period there were few formalities and no absolute _estilo_, or recognized method of procedure. In the enormous work crowded upon the inexperienced tribunals, the main object was the despatch of business, and the success attained in this is seen in the frequent and enormous autos de fe. The records of the trials are hasty and imperfect, showing that little attention was paid to forms that might cause delay. The Instructions of 1484 are crude, merely meant to supplement the traditional system of inquisitorial procedure with such regulations as should adapt it to the needs of the situation and to the intentions of Ferdinand and Isabella. They are largely devoted to the questions of confiscation and the fines accruing under the Edicts of Grace and, for the rest, they conclude by saying that, as all circumstances cannot be foreseen and provided for, everything is left to the discretion of the inquisitors who, in all that is not especially prescribed, must conform themselves to the law and act according to the dictates of their consciences for the service of God and the sovereigns.[102] The result of this discretion was that, in the assembly of the inquisitors in 1488, a long debate was required to reach the conclusion that there should be uniformity in the procedure and acts of all the tribunals, the existing diversity having led to many embarrassments.[103]