The Soskovets campaign strategy refers to the strategy devised by Oleg Soskovets for Boris Yeltsin's 1996 reelection campaign for the Presidency of Russia. This strategy served as the initial template for Yeltsin's campaign before being discarded by March 1996.
The strategy was created under the premise that, in order to defeat nationalists and protofacist candidates in the 1996 election, Yeltsin would need to co-opt their policies. The strategy, however, failed to produce a rise in Yeltsin's poll numbers. The strategy was also a partial motive for Yeltsin's aggressive response to Chechen discord. His aggressive response in Chechnya initiated a highly unpopular war and consequentially had a significantly negative impact on his approval rating.
A plethora of coinciding factors persuaded Yeltsin to officially abandon the strategy by mid-March 1996.
History
Conception
The campaign strategy had been devised by Oleg Soskovets in response to the defeat of pro-Yeltsin parties in the 1993 and 1995 legislative elections. To craft the strategy, Soskovets worked alongside others such as Alexander Korzhakov. Soskovets had come to the conclusion that for Yeltsin to win in 1996, he would need to adopt some of Zhirinovsky's style of rhetoric. Per Soskovet's assessment, Yelstin would need to position himself as an intermediate between the reformers and the Zhirinovsky-style proto-fascists by coopting the platforms of both. Yeltsin had grown distrusting of leading politicians and organizations of the reformist political movement. This contributed to Yeltsin's willingness to abandon many elements of reformist politics that he had previously championed. Soskovets earned influence as Yeltsin began ousting a number of reformists from his inner-circle.
Rise of the strategy
With Soskovets having become one of the most influential members of his inner circle, Yeltsin began to take steps to acquire a more nationalist image. To illustrate his new partial embrace of nationalism, Yeltsin spoke in his 1995 State of the Federation Speech of plans to strengthen the state by cracking down on crime. Yelstin issued harsh rhetoric against foes to the nation.
The cluster bombing of Chechnya bolstered the image of a more nationalist Yeltsin presidency. However, the bombings failed to produce any immediate improvement of Yeltsin's popularity. While the military action may have boosted Yeltsin's nationalist credentials, the war was opposed by the majority of Russians. Yeltsin's failure's to cleanly end the Chechen revolt had cost him support amongst the ranks of Russia's more liberal politicians. However it had earned him support in some consequential fractions of the armed forces. Nezavisimaya Gazeta editor Vitaly Tretyakov reported that, in the midst of this military action, perception of Yeltsin's grip on power was so weak that Russia's political elite was anticipating an eventual coup. Tretyakov even said that Russia's political elite would have been surprised if one did not occur.
Despite the aforementioned turmoil that the Soskovets strategy had ignited, it was not abandoned. Contrarily, it was soon adopted even further. This is due to the fact that the failure of reformist parties in the 1995 legislative elections bolstered Soskovet's argument. In the aftermath of the 1995 parliamentary elections, hard-liners championing the Soskovets strategy momentarily acquired a stronger role in Yeltsin's administration, as they were able to convince Yeltsin that the results of the legislative elections were proof that campaigning as a reformist would be disastrous for him. Many Yeltsin's inner-circle had also come to momentarily interprate the communist showing in 1995 as a protest vote against Yeltsin's economic reform program. They viewed the strong showing of Zhirinovsky's party as evidence that Russians desired a strong, decisive leader that would fight crime, terrorism and disorder, thus leading them agree to comply with Soskovets' strategy.
Yeltsin saw little use for reform-minded democrats. He was now convinced that in order to defeat Zyuganov, he would have to play the game similarly to the communists. Soskovets was appointed by Yeltsin as the coordinator of his still-unannounced reelection campaign.