USS Atule (SS/AGSS-403), a Balao-class submarine, was the only ship of the United States Navy to be named for the atule.
Construction and commissioning
Atule′s keel was laid down on 25 November 1943 by the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine. Atule was launched on 6 March 1944 sponsored by Miss Elizabeth Louise Kauffman, the daughter of Rear Admiral James L. Kauffman, and commissioned on 21 June 1944.
Service history
United States Navy
World War II
Following a month of shakedown training along the east coast, the submarine departed New London, Connecticut, and headed south to join the action in the Pacific. During a 15-day stopover at the Fleet Sound School in Key West, Florida, she sharpened her diving skills and fighting techniques. After transiting the Panama Canal, Atule steamed to Pearl Harbor with , training intensively en route to reach a peak of combat readiness. Upon her arrival at Pearl Harbor, Atule underwent voyage repairs and torpedo training into October.
On 9 October, Atule departed Pearl Harbor on her first war patrol in company with and Jallao. Under the command of Commander Bernard Clarey in Pintado, the three boats formed a wolf pack known as "Clarey's Crushers". Atule trained with Jallao and Pintado as they traveled westward. On 11 October, Atule picked up two radar contacts, tracked them, and maneuvered around them before identifying the contacts as and . The pack arrived at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, on 21 October, refueled, made minor repairs, and departed early the next day. On 25 October, the wolf pack made its first score when Jallao hit light cruiser Tama and sent her to the bottom. That Japanese warship already had been damaged in the Battle off Cape Engaño and was part of the broken Japanese carrier-centered fleet retiring to the north. The wolf pack then spent two more days vainly searching for enemy vessels crippled during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The boats then set course for their patrol sectors in Luzon Strait and the South China Sea.
Over the next few days, Atule made but lost several ship contacts. Shortly after midnight on 1 November, she established surface radar contact on a fast-moving escorted transport and moved in for the kill. Despite rain squalls and heavy seas, Atule was able to close the transport and fire six torpedoes. The first hit caused a terrific explosion which threw flaming material high in the air. When one of the transport's escorts began to close the submarine, she began a crash dive but still managed to hear a second explosion as she submerged. Nine depth charges exploded in the vicinity, but none was close enough to damage Atule. The crew in the submarine heard loud breaking up noises and upon surfacing, found a large oil slick and much debris. Atule was later credited with sinking the Asama Maru.
Atule continued her patrol, covering the Hong Kong-Manila traffic lane in the South China Sea and occasionally breaking off to investigate a contact report or to take special scouting dispositions by order of the pack commander. On 3 November, Jallao reported a five-ship force heading south, and the wolf pack moved to intercept. The contacts were moving at , and Atule was never able to come within range for attack. However Pintado had better luck. That submarine's target was thought to be a large escorted oiler (actually the aircraft carrier Jun'yō), but before her torpedoes could strike the oiler crossed their path and disintegrated in a tremendous explosion which was seen and heard on board Atule. The smoke screen provided by the ensuing fires protected the target, and Pintado was forced to withdraw.
During the next ten days, the wolf pack occasionally sighted ships or aircraft, but was unable to attack. On 13 November, Jallao reported an enemy ship. Pintado and Atule altered course to intercept the contact, and at 0850, Atule sighted what appeared to be the foretop of a battleship. At 1000, the enemy contact was established as an aircraft carrier, a heavy cruiser, and one destroyer. Atule maneuvered to approach the force as closely as possible, hoping that the enemy ships would initiate a "zig-zag" course which would bring them within range of her torpedoes. The Japanese force indeed did begin to "zig-zag", but, instead of making them vulnerable, the maneuver took the force out of range. At 1115, contact was lost.