From this analysis it is abundantly clear that Kant's famous leading principle is not--as he maintains with tireless repetition--a =categorical=, but in reality a =hypothetical= Imperative; because it tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be established for what I do--inasmuch as I make it universal--shall also be a law for what is done to me; and because I, under this condition, as the _eventualiter_ non-active party, =cannot= possibly =wish= for injustice and hard-heartedness. But if I strike out this proviso, and, trusting perhaps to my surpassing strength of mind and body, think of myself as always =active=, and never =passive=; then, in choosing the precept which is to be universally valid, if there exists no basis for ethics other than Kant's, I can perfectly well wish that injustice and hard-heartedness should be the general rule, and consequently order the world
Upon the simple plan, That they should take, who have the power, And they should keep, who can. --(WORDSWORTH.)
In the foregoing chapter we showed that the Kantian leading principle of Ethics is devoid of all real foundation. It is now clear that to this singular defect must be added, notwithstanding Kant's express assertion to the contrary, its concealed hypothetical nature, whereby its basis turns out to be nothing else than Egoism, the latter being the secret interpreter of the direction which it contains. Furthermore, regarding it solely as a formula, we find that it is only a periphrasis, an obscure and disguised mode of expressing the well-known rule: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_ (do not to another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself); if, that is, by omitting the _non_ and _ne_, we remove the limitation, and include the duties taught by love as well as those prescribed by law. For it is obvious that this is the only precept which I can wish should regulate the conduct of all men (speaking, of course, from the point of view of the possibly =passive part= I may play, where my =Egoism= is touched). This rule, _Quod tibi fieri, etc._, is, however, in its turn, merely a circumlocution for, or, if it be preferred, a premise of, the proposition which I have laid down as the simplest and purest definition of the conduct required by the common consent of all ethical systems; namely, _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva_ (do harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies in your power). The true and real substance of Morals is this, and never can be anything else. But on what is it based? What is it that lends force to this command? This is the old and difficult problem with which man is still to-day confronted. For, on the other side, we hear Egoism crying with a loud voice: _Neminem juva, immo omnes, si forte conducit, laede_ (help nobody, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any advantage); nay more, Malice gives us the variant: _Immo omnes, quantum potes, laede_ (but rather injure all people as far as you can). To bring into the lists a combatant equal, or rather superior to Egoism and Malice combined--this is the task of all Ethics. _Heic Rhodus, heic salta!_[2]