Referring to the first inductive syllogism of section _one_, it is assumed that the robin, crow and sparrow are representative birds, and that we are thus justified in concluding that if these _type_ birds have wings, then _all_ birds must have wings. Of course this is more or less of a conjecture or “a hazard”; since birds without wings may exist in some undiscovered corner of the globe. However, inasmuch as the generalization concerns a representative quality, we deem the assumption fairly well founded. The logical right to take this “leap into the unknown” will be discussed later. It will profit us at this time to realize more fully how essential the “inductive hazard” is to the progress of the world. When the Schoolmen of mediæval time refused to venture, they failed to progress, and thus came the dark days. Whenever man has ignored this God given instinct which leads to discovery, the world has stood still. _This willingness to “take a leap into the dark” with the hope of finding, in the shadow, truth which would enhance man’s power and increase his serviceableness, has given to the world about all that is worth while._ It was the spirit of the _hazard_ which pushed Columbus to the discovery of a new world; which gave Newton the secrets of the motions of the universe; which enabled Edison to harness a multitude of lurking forces; and Morse and Bell to reduce distance to its lowest terms. In ordinary affairs with ordinary men those succeed _best_ who manifest _most_ a safe, steady, persistent spirit of discovery. _Here, then, in the “inductive hazard” have we a most important phase of school life which, in this day of making the work easy, is being sadly neglected._ On the other hand, an unregulated and insane spirit of venture may result in a great waste of energy, and in the development of low ideals of recklessness and inaccuracy. The “inductive hazard” must be cultivated; yet it must be regulated as well, and, as the reader already realizes, logic needs to concern itself mainly with this _regulative_ aspect.
=3. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION.=
The problem of induction is much more complex than that of deduction because of these reasons: First. Deduction as a process of reasoning was the only kind discussed by the logicians for _two thousand years_. Aristotle is called the father of deductive logic and this Intellectual Giant, the greatest of ancient time and possibly of all time, so perfected the form of deductive reasoning that, up to the time of Francis Bacon, no scholar possessed the temerity to gainsay its supremacy in the field of logical reasoning. For twenty centuries Aristotle’s Deductive Logic was the _Logicians’ Bible_. On the other hand, inductive reasoning, though it was briefly discussed by Aristotle, received little attention till the versatile Francis Bacon placed it upon the stage of the thinking world. This makes deduction nearly two thousand years older than induction. Time, by eliminating the personal equation and exposing in various ways fallacious thinking, tends to unify and universalize truth. Hence, logicians are agreed so far as the fundamentals of deductive logic are concerned, but are still at odds over the true conception and use of inductive logic.