The attempt to substitute general terms for particulars is evidenced also in the definition of the right, and of the acts which constitute an infringement of the right. The present statute (sec. 4952) defines the right to consist in the sole liberty to do certain things. The bill (sec. 1) defines the right to be the sole and exclusive right to do certain things, and it specifies those things; but its specifications are in terms very different from those in the present statute.
The present statute (secs. 4965 and 4966) specifies certain acts which are to be deemed an infringement. The bill, having defined the right of the copyright proprietor as the exclusive right to do certain things, defines an infringement to consist in the doing or causing to be done without his consent of any of those things, the right to do or authorize which is exclusively reserved to him. It contents itself with this, adding only the one specification that "any reproduction," without his consent, "of any work or material part of any work in which [his] copyright is subsisting," shall be an infringement.
So as to the person who may obtain copyright: The present statute mentions the "author, inventor, designer, or proprietor," and elsewhere the "originator." The bill rests with the term used in the Constitution, "author," adding only "proprietor," which is not merely in the existing statutes, but has been construed in a series of judicial decisions.
Copyright consists of the exclusive right within a defined period to do certain things with certain subject-matter and to prevent other people from doing these things. The fundamental provisions of the copyright law are therefore these four:
How may the exclusive right to do them be secured?
Upon the third point, "How may the right be secured?" the bill modifies substantially the existing requirements of law. These make deposit and registration in the copyright office a condition precedent. They require the deposit to be at least coincident with the publication, and they stipulate that failure to comply precisely with this requirement shall avoid the copyright ab initio.
The bill, in section 9, initiates the copyright from the date of the publication of the work, with the notice of copyright affixed. So, in effect, does the present law initiate the copyright from that date, provided the deposit and registration be effected then; but by the bill the publication with notice not merely initiates the copyright, it "secures" it. That is the expression used in the bill.