Congress will meet on December 2nd, which will not diminish the difficulty of managing matters here. It is supposed that General McClellan will be obliged to attempt some forward movement, in order that he and the Government may be able to meet the fiery legislators. They hoped the Beaufort affair would have been sufficient, but like all they do, the effect is so much weakened, first by the preposterous boastings beforehand, and secondly by the fabulous accounts of the success first given, that something new must if possible be provided.

The Finances are kept in an apparently prosperous condition, by postponing all but the most pressing payments. In this manner the New York Banks are not pressed to pay up the sums they have taken of the Loan. The people are so enamoured of their last brilliant discovery in political economy that it was seriously intended to raise the Morrill Tariff, in order that no money might go out of the country and nothing be imported but 'gold and silver to carry on the war with.' The Cabinet has now however, I understand, determined to recommend that the Morrill Tariff be not touched. One cannot help hoping that some one may be reasonable enough to suggest the idea of a Revenue Tariff.

Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy — Part 42

General McClellan's own plan is said to be to gain a great victory, and then, with or without the sanction of Congress and the President, to propose the most favourable terms to the South if it will only come back. It is a curious sign of the confusion into which things are falling, that such a plan is coolly discussed. I mean that part of it which consists in the General's acting without the consent of the President and Congress.

Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy — Part 42

The people here are extremely frightened about the capture on board the _Trent_. The New York money market gives signs of this. Another indication is the moderation of the newspapers, which is for them wonderful. They have put in more correct accounts of my language (or rather silence). I rather suspect that this must have been done on a hint from Mr. Seward. As a general rule I abstain from noticing anything the newspapers say about me. On this occasion in particular contradiction from me would have been almost as dangerous as affirmation, so I left the assertions to take their chance.

Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy — Part 42